Conflict-Sensitive Programming with Pastoralist Communities

Improved Community Response to Drought (ICRD) Project

Documentation of Experiences with the Application of the “Do No Harm” Approach

by

Vétérinaires sans Frontières (Germany)

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(On title page)
Photo 1: Camel bell at Dukana

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List of Acronyms of Organizations
CDA Collaborative for Development Action
DFID Department for International Development
ECHO European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid
EPARDA Ethiopian Pastoralist Research and Development Agency
LCPP Local Capacities for Peace Project
STIPA Support for Tropical Initiatives in Poverty Alleviation
UNICEF United Nations Children Fund
VSF Vétérinaires sans Frontières
VSFG Vétérinaires sans Frontières - Germany

List of Abbreviations
ICRD Improved Community Response to Drought
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
PFS Pastoral Field School
VICOBA Village Community Banking

Comment on the Spelling of Names
There has been an inconsistency in the spelling of names in various project documents, in official maps, in publications and in evaluation reports. For reasons of clarity, this document uses only one spelling for the names of locations and of ethnic groups. Some quotations may have been slightly altered for this purpose.

This affects the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place Names</th>
<th>Names of Ethnic Groups</th>
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<tr>
<td>Buluk</td>
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<td>Darate</td>
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<td>Dukana</td>
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<td>Sabare</td>
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Foreword

With increasing population growth and occurrence of climatic extremes, the pastoralist livelihood in Eastern Africa experiences higher pressure resulting more frequently in humanitarian interventions. Currently, in vast areas in the pastoralist communities food relief is being distributed continuously throughout the year, making communities dependent on external aid and weakening their ability to respond by themselves. The situation led to a paradigm change on how to approach this particular situation. It is now widely recognized, to aim to empower the communities and authorities to prepare themselves for disasters, to set-up functional early warning systems and elaborate preparedness plans, besides the necessary response with food relief. The European Commission adopted the Regional Drought Decision and the Drought Management Initiative which are attempts to break this vicious cycle of ever increasing numbers of aid dependent communities and to find solutions for the recurring disasters.

Most pastoralist societies do have mechanisms in place that functioned for many centuries and provided a base for people to survive in fragile environments, such as the arid lands in Kenya and elsewhere. However, settings changed over the last decades. Areas previously used during the dry season are utilised for dry land farming, state boundaries divide grazing lands, ever larger population inhibits mobility, and increased conflicts involving modern arms restrain communities in their areas of origin. Larger and more permanent settlements exploit water resources more rapidly. A project aimed at community development and which concentrates efforts that shall result in communities prepared for recurring disasters must follow conflict sensitive programming approaches if it aims to be sustainable and tackling the root problem. Our team went with a number of innovative approaches into the field, but we learnt that intercommunity communication and conflict management can not be overemphasised as a tool for working in disaster preparedness. We are glad for ECHO’s mid-term evaluation team under Hans Hartung for having stressed the need and encourage us to document these experiences.

Dr. Andreas Jenet

Part 1:
The Setting
Introduction

Background

VSF’s Work in Northern Kenya

Vétérinaires sans Frontières (VSF) Belgium, Switzerland and Germany are international non-governmental organizations whose mission is to improve the welfare of vulnerable populations in developing countries, through improving animal health and production beside others. They have combined their twelve years of experience in the dry lands of Northern Kenya and the border regions of neighbouring countries to implement the “Improved Community Response to Drought” (ICRD) project.

ICRD is a cross-border drought preparedness project funded under ECHO’s Regional Drought Decision. Its overall objective is to contribute to the improved livelihood security of pastoralists in Karamoja, Oromiya and Somali ecosystems of Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia through the development and dissemination of a model to empower communities to pro-actively address their own needs.

Rather than providing significant levels of external support, the project seeks to enable pastoralists to build on their own knowledge and to utilize their existing assets (both social and capital) more effectively. ICRD is a pilot project, which seeks to provide a model for future drought preparedness programming. If successful, this model is supposed to be replicated in other pastoralist environments.

VSF Germany is engaged in the field of veterinary relief and development work. Founded as a students’ initiative in 1991 at the University of Veterinary Medicine at Hannover, the head office is still located at the University of Hannover, Germany. VSF Germany supports people in developing countries whose livelihoods depend on livestock in their endeavours to prevent harm from themselves and their animals and thus to improve their living conditions actively. The global warming and the dramatic population growth diminish the living space of pastoralist communities. VSF Germany’s projects contribute to that these people can utilize their natural resources in a better, more sustainable way and thus secure themselves a stable existence. Furthermore, the organization promotes peaceful conflict resolution methods, as peace is seen as a basic precondition for a stable livelihood. It is VSF Germany’s conviction that the globalization makes it necessary to build inter-cultural bridges to promote understanding and respect for different ways of life.

Purpose of the Documentation

As part of the intervention activities, conflict management – particularly through conflict-sensitive community planning – was assumed to result in “increased livelihood security through decreased conflict and increased sustainable access to dry season grazing and water”.

Activities comprised community planning meetings, especially in regard to issues such as livestock raiding and cross-border dry season movements, in order to establish community-based resource planning teams. Inter-community planning meetings resulted in resource use maps and in plans for the establishment and positioning of water retention structures in important dry season grazing areas or along marketing routes. Provision of training was provided on drought preparedness and natural resource management to water management committees. It was assumed that 10% of land previously inaccessible due to insecurity or scarcity of water will be accessed through established, strategically located dry season water points and through monitored inter-community agreements by the end of the project.

During the process of implementing the activities it became obvious that a more conscious approach is needed to systematically address conflict-sensitive programming and conflict management. It was therefore stated to internalize and document the methodology and lessons learnt in peace management in Ileret following an explicit recommendation by the ECHO evaluation team. The objective of the work is an assessment or a review of the methodology used in Ileret, to be followed by the development of a handbook on the methodology and the review of case studies on conflict-sensitive planning and programming. This will create a framework for the “Improved Community Response to Drought” (ICRD) project during its second phase in 2009/10.

Methodology

Performance Observation and Participatory Reflection

Much of the time of this documentation assignment was dedicated to carefully looking at the process of introducing conflict-sensitive planning at the programme level and at the integration of selected tools from participatory approaches to development planning. Both steps were analysed in view of the relevance for the specific context in the area of operation and for the situation of the local population, and with the perspective of defining the added value of conflict-sensitive planning for the implementation of activities. While the achievements of the programme and the way the programme was managed were also observed in the process, this did not form part of this assignment, however. A formal evaluation taking place at roughly the same time was to look at these issues.

The field visit to Kenya involved an intensive study of numerous documents, several in-depth interviews with programme staff and key informants, informal discussions with community members in Northern Kenya, and site visits to Dukana and Ileret as well as to some specific locations in the surrounding areas. During the field visits, emphasis was given to understanding the various steps in the process of introducing conflict sensitivity and to listening to people’s perceptions about the changes this had caused. The responses of local staff and of project beneficiaries were supposed to provide more information on the conceptualization of the process and on benefits and challenges faced, as well as on the expectations that people have towards VSF.

The following steps were undertaken in order to assess the replicability of the process:

- studying of available documents;
- structured interviews2 with staff of VSF and with office bearers in Nairobi, in Dukana and in Ileret;
- focus-group discussions in Dukana and Ileret;
- site visits to Dukana, Sabare, Surie and Koobi Fora.

At all stages the documentation process put emphasis on a participatory and transparent approach. This meant in particular to present findings for further discussion and to engage the staff of VSF in coming to shared conclusions about the observed outcomes and about opportunities for improvement. It is hoped that the results of this report will thus be owned by exactly those people who would be in charge to put the recommendations into practice.

Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Programming

Based on the fact that VSF’s project on “Improved Community Response to Drought” was implemented in a situation where various ethnic groups were competing about scarce natural resources, it was decided to apply the “Do No Harm” approach as an integral part of the programming process, which forms the main focus of this documentation. The need for conflict-sensitive approaches in relief and development operations had first been recognized in the early 1990s, when the traumatic experiences in Somalia and in Rwanda had forced international agencies to review the ways they were operating. As a result of a collaborative reflection process involving numerous organizations and field workers around the globe, this had led to the development of a particular approach, with which negative side-effects of relief or development projects on a part-

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1 A full list of all documents provided can be found in Annex 2.
2 The list of interview partners can be found in Annex 1.
ticular context of conflict might be avoided. This so-called “Do No Harm” approach\(^3\) is supposed to be incorporated into the planning processes that the respective agencies apply, as well as into the continuous implementation of activities. The purpose is not to change the objective of a project from, for example, improved community response to drought (as in the case analysed in this documentation) to peace-building and reconciliation, but rather to make sure that the activities implemented do not have inadvertent negative side-effects on the local context of conflict. This documentation will particularly analyse the way that the various components of the “Do No Harm” approach have been utilized by VSF, what were the lessons learnt and what conclusions can be drawn for future application.

While the “Do No Harm” approach is meant to help organizations working “in conflict”, i.e. to successfully implement relief or development activities in a context of violent confrontations, this has its limitations in situations where the particular conflict setting has a direct impact on the development perspectives themselves. This has obviously been the case in the area of operation of VSF, where the capacity of the local population to effectively respond to the occurrence of drought had been impeded by a high level of insecurity. Accordingly, the technical inputs provided by the project had to be complemented not only by “Do No Harm”, but also by other approaches that were meant to deal directly with the conflict situation. For the purpose of this documentation, these efforts to work “on conflict” were assessed by aspects from the “Reflecting on Peace Practices” approach\(^4\).

This approach, which tries to analyse the effectiveness of peace work itself, was supposed to give insights on the degree to which the work of VSF has made a difference on the conflict situation itself. Tools taken from the “Reflecting on Peace Practices” approach were the Four Cell-Matrix, the Criteria of Effectiveness and the Analysis of Linkages. Through this, it was possible to analyse the entry point of the programme, its horizontal and vertical development and the strategies behind it, the use of linkages with other national and international actors, and the effectiveness in terms of impact on a wider level.

**Participatory Planning**

As mentioned above, the “Do No Harm” approach can not stand alone, but has to be integrated into other planning tools. In the case of the implementation of activities at field level in the ICRD programme, several components of participatory planning were used in order not only to have projects staff and local people understand how individual decisions could negatively affect the context of conflict, but also give the communities a clear role in the decision-making process. Based on the particular skills of the project staff at Ileret, these components were derived from the concept of Participatory Integrated Community Development, which had been developed in Kenya by a consulting organization called STIPA. This concept comprises a number of traditional tools of “Participatory Rural Appraisal”, which had been adapted to the East African context, and which are supplemented by additional tools, developed and tested locally in Kenya. The concept of Participatory Integrated Community Development puts strong emphasis on the ownership of development processes by the local communities, who would ideally be responsible for their own specific “community action plans”, for the implementation of the activities defined and even for the monitoring of the process. A description of the tools used during the planning processes in Northern Kenya can be found in part 2 of this documentation, which covers the findings (see page 37).

### Practical Implementation of the Assignment

Based on the methodological considerations explained above, this documentation assignment tried to look at the various aspects of VSF’s programme in Northern Kenya from different perspectives. Main focus was the utilization of the “Do No Harm” approach, the experiences made with its practical application, and the limitations faced during the process. At the same time, it was also found interesting to analyse how specific questions that form an essential part of the “Do No Harm” approach could be incorporated into a participatory planning process, combining the aspects of conflict sensitivity with the promotion of community ownership. In addition to that, the specific context in the area of operation had forced the project staff to go the additional step and also address conflict directly. The impact of these efforts was assessed from the perspective of the “Reflecting on Peace Practices” approach.

Following the participatory way of project planning and implementation which VSF had taken up, the documentation of results also had to apply the same line of thinking. Accordingly, most of the time during the field visits was devoted to informal meetings with community members, during which opportunity was given to describe the processes observed and the results achieved from the perspective of the local population. Although this process was rather time-consuming, the impressions gained in these meetings are considered very relevant, particularly with regard to the perceptions that the communities in the different locations have developed.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to cross the Ethiopian border and to include responses from that side into this report. Accordingly, the findings are limited to the perceptions of the Gabra and Dasanach communities in the Kenyan side, and of course on the perceptions of the local authorities in Kenya and the experiences of the project staff involved.

The following activities were conducted as part of the documentation process:

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<td>July 6</td>
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<td>Nairobi</td>
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<td>Preparatory discussions with programme staff</td>
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<td>July 9</td>
<td>North Horr</td>
<td>Flight to Northern Kenya</td>
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<td>North Horr</td>
<td>Interview with programme manager</td>
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<td>July 10</td>
<td>Dukana - Ileret</td>
<td>Journey to Dukana</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dukana</td>
<td>Meetings with community members</td>
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<td>July 11</td>
<td>Dukana - Ileret</td>
<td>Site visit to Dukana well area</td>
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<td>Dukana</td>
<td>Journey to Ileret with site visit to Sabare</td>
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<td>selected local informants</td>
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<td>Site visits to Surge and to Koobi Fora</td>
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<td>July 16</td>
<td>Ileret - Nairobi</td>
<td>Return flight from Northern Kenya</td>
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<td>July 17</td>
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<td>Interviews with VSF management staff</td>
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\(^3\) A full description of the “Do No Harm” approach is included in part 2 of this documentation report between pages 21 and 28.

\(^4\) The “Reflecting on Peace Practices Project” was a collaborative effort to analyse the effectiveness of peace work around the world in which numerous international and local organizations participated. As with the “Do No Harm” approach, this process was coordinated by an American consultancy organization called Collaborative for Development Action. The main findings of the project have been published in a booklet called “Confronting War – Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners”. 
This report tries to document the experiences with the application of the “Do No Harm” approach from an analytical perspective. The first part covers the background of VSF’s project activities in Northern Kenya, presenting the organization itself, the methodologies used with regard to conflict-sensitive programming, as well as the situation of conflict, in which the drought-stricken communities along the Kenyan-Ethiopian border find themselves. The second part looks at the practical experience gained from the application of specific aspects taken from the “Do No Harm” approach, starting with a detailed description of the approach itself, leading to an analysis of the process followed, and finally reaching the assessment of the lessons learnt from the perspectives of the staff, of the communities, and of an outside consultant. Based on these lessons learnt, the third part of this report suggests how a formal process of integrating conflict-sensitivity into the work with pastoralist communities could be formulated, looking particularly at roles and objectives, at structures and capacities, and at approaches and linkages. Finally, the fourth part presents practical tools that may be of help in this process.

Situation Analysis

Socio-Economic Situation

Geographical Location and Development Needs

VSF Germany is operating on both sides of the Kenyan-Ethiopian border to the east of Lake Turkana, in an area which is home to a number of pastoralist communities. This area is located between 3° and 5° North and between 36° and 37° East and is marked by high temperatures throughout the year and by very limited rainfall (approximately 250 mm per year). Accordingly, there are poor soils, and the vegetation consists mainly of thorn shrubs, typical for a semi-desert environment.

Apart from the flat Chalbi Desert, the landscape is marked by volcanic mountains, which receive slightly higher amounts of rainfall and which offer grazing opportunities for the animals of the different ethnic groups living here. The absence of permanent streams and the seasonal rainfall variations are forcing people into a migratory lifestyle, dependent on the availability of water and grass for a limited time before the herds have to move on. The geomorphological features of the area do offer, however, water sources under the dry river beds stretching from the mountains to the surrounding lowlands. These water sources have been tapped for generations through the digging of wells below the rocky underground, from where people bring up the water by “human ladders”, lifting buckets to the surface in a steady rhythm accompanied by singing praise to the respective owner of the wells. The towns of North Horr and Dukana owe their existence to the permanent availability of water and have developed into settlements of considerable size.

The current border between Kenya and Ethiopia was established at the end of the 19th century, dividing these pastoralist lands into two separate areas of influence between British East Africa to the South and the Ethiopian Empire to the North. The area has remained marginal for both Kenya and Ethiopia ever since, and to both capitals it takes more than a day’s travel to reach. The remote location has led to a situation of neglect where the local population has been cut off from most developments in both countries. And so, the situation of health and education services, for example, is appalling. On the Kenyan side, the government
seems to be hardly present in locations like Ilaret and Dukana, meaning that the work of VSF had to be taken up almost in isolation.5

Based on the particular expertise of the organization, VSF selected animal health care and livestock management as main fields of intervention. These are obviously the most important aspects for the local population, whose lives very much centre around their animals. Due to the dependence on water and pasture, climatic variations have a potentially devastating effect on the livelihoods of the pastoralists, and so there is a strong need to address disaster preparedness and drought response accordingly.

Many other development problems still remain, though.

“Improved Community Response to Drought”

Contrary to the attitudes of most urban dwellers and unfortunately also many government institutions, pastoralism is particularly well adapted to dry-land environments. It has clearly been shown that pastoralist systems operate effectively in low and highly variable rainfall conditions, both in terms of economics and of social structures. Unfortunately, however, pastoralist livelihoods systems seem to become increasingly vulnerable. What are the reasons? “Human populations are rising, the climate is changing and international markets are setting ever-higher barriers for access. Infrastructure is poorly developed, education and literacy levels remain very low and competition for scarce resources is increasing.”6

In view of their highly vulnerable livelihoods, pastoralist societies have felt the need to reflect about appropriate strategies to reduce their risks and have developed various systems of risk management. Two interesting studies have analysed these responses on the Ethiopian and on the Kenyan side of the border, discovering the following facts:7

- Strategies among Ethiopian pastoralists:
  - diversification of livelihoods;
  - use of informal transfers;
  - children’s education;
  - improving the availability of basic services and resources;
  - coping strategies in terms of herd composition and feeding;
  - management of gender-related risks;
  - adaptation of land ownership patterns.

- Responses from Kenyan pastoralists:
  - migration;
  - herd management strategies, particularly in terms of male-female relations, livestock species, herd sizes and divisions, breeding patterns;
  - adaptations of feeding practices;
  - disease management;
  - social safety networks;

The intention of VSF’s intervention along the Kenyan-Ethiopian border was based on the local experiences which the communities had already made themselves. In the project proposal, for example, it is stated that “the livelihoods objective of supplementary feeding is to protect a core herd of breeding animals, and encourage post-drought recovery. This requires participatory assessment with pastoralists to agree on the composition and size of core breeding herds before drought occurs. Supplementary feeding is not a stand-alone intervention – it should be part of an overall drought cycle management approach which combines early de-stocking and preventive veterinary care.”8

Context of Conflict

Gabbra and Dasanach - Pastoralist Communities in Northern Kenya

The two main ethnic groups on the Kenyan side of VSF’s area of operation are the Gabbra and the Dasanach. Both are living in Marsabit North District to the east of Lake Turkana in a harsh environment that, in terms of land-use, does not allow much else than keeping animals in a pastoralist way. The traditional areas of the Dasanach, who are sometimes also called Mereille or nicknamed “Shangila”, are located immediately to the east of the lake on both sides of the Kenyan-Ethiopian border with the small town of Il-eret as their centre. The area of the Gabbra is situated further to the east and to the south, covering the fringes of the Chalbi Desert with the town of North Horr as the economic capital of the district.9

5 “No other partner or Government Department was involved since none existed in the area.” (GITHINJI & MURSAL, page 22)
6 PANTULIANO & WEKESA, page 8
7 All the information listed here for the Ethiopian side is taken from PANTULIANO & WEKESA, pages 9-10; for the Kenyan side from AKILU & WEKESA, pages 6-7.
8 ICRD Project Proposal, page 3
9 GITHINJI & MURSAL, page 19
10 HARTUNG: Technical Appraisal No. 07
The fact that the colonial history has put the Dasanach community on both sides of an international border has led to the situation that their traditional areas are split into two distinct parts and that they feel marginalized both by the Kenyan and the Ethiopian government. There even seem to be doubts on the Kenyan side that all inhabitants of Ilere are real Kenyans or in fact Ethiopians who have crossed the border in search for “greener pastures”. Frequent reports that individual members of the Dasanach communities have been denied identity cards or voters’ registration seem to confirm this feeling of marginalization. Looking at the infrastructure of the place, there is a strong impression that the Kenyan government is hardly present in any other form than as a security force.

As a consequence, the Dasanach community has lacked access to most basic services like health and education. Even the few economic activities that have cropped up, such as meat production or fishing in Lake Turkana, are severely impeded by the difficult accessibility of the area and the lack of transport facilities, and so the lives of the Dasanach have not been affected much by the spread of modern civilization. Even the religious outreach has only recently discovered Ilere with the Benedictine mission as the most prominent actor. The livelihood of most members of this ethnic group is determined by the needs of their animals, whom they follow in search for water and pasture, with goats and sheep followed by cattle the most common of the animals kept by the Dasanach.

Even before the arrival of VSF, the Catholic Church had taken up this issue and had engaged in peace-building activities between the two tribes. Through the work of the Catholic Peace and Justice Commission, even the few economic activities that have cropped up, some of the underlying causes for the differences between the two ethnic groups have been analysed, and work has been done in order to change attitudes and behaviours. This has included the preaching for “love” and “forgiveness” and the assistance to victims of the conflict, but has also extended to creating bridges between Gabbra and Dasanach. The admission of children from Ilere into the secondary school in North Horr has opened education opportunities for the Dasanach community and has also meant that friendship contacts could develop between individuals on both sides. The same effect has been attributed to specific exchange programmes (sports, tournaments, choirs), leading to individual friendly encounters, and to the “peace ambassadors teachers” programme. Recently, the provision of loans for women to start bead production has also tried to open up new economic opportunities for the Dasanach community.

Cross-Border Raids between Kenyan and Ethiopian Groups

While the differences between the Dasanach and the Gabbra represent the context of conflict most close to the “ Improved Community Response to Drought” project of VSF11, the situation on the ground is far more complex. Apart from the Dasanach, whose traditional areas are split by the international border between Kenya and Ethiopia, there are a number of other distinct ethnic groups in this area, whose economies and socio-cultural traditions are equally based on pastoralism. On the Ethiopian side of the border north of the Dasanach and Gabbra areas live the Hamar, the Albore and the Borana, with whom and among whom competition over water and grazing land as well as the ubiquitous cattle raids have also resulted in the frequent occurrence of violence.

There is little respect for international boundaries from the side of the various pastoralist communities, and so cross-border raids have become a frequent phenomenon, which are also questioning the roles of the administration and the police forces in the respective countries, making such incidences a bilateral problem between the two governments in Kenya and in Ethiopia. People in Dukana, for example, complain that there is widespread availability of small arms on the Ethiopian side, and that the police does not interfere. Such suspicions about the seriousness of government authorities are paired with plenty of stereotypes about the neighbouring ethnic groups, who are considered mostly illiterate with “war forming

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11 Due to the fact that VSF is only registered in Kenya, the project offices are located in North Horr and in Ilere on the Kenyan side, while all activities on the Ethiopian side are implemented by a local partner organization called EPARDA. For logistical reasons, it was not possible to look at project activities on the Ethiopian side of the border during the field visit for this documentation assignment. For this reason, the Gabbra - Dasanach conflict also remains in the focus of this publication.
part of their life". During the field visits it was clearly observed that, even on the Kenyan side of the border, herders were prominently displaying their guns to demonstrate readiness for defence against any possible aggressor. People in Surge explained that there is sometimes fighting about water and pasture between their own Dasanach community and the neighbouring Hamar.

For the Gabbra in Dukana, the neighbouring community across the border belongs to the ethnic group of the Borana, and despite their kinship and their common language there have been several years of serious violent interaction between the two groups, culminating in a massacre of 75 people, including women and children, at Turbi in 2005. Since then, there is a deep-rooted mistrust dividing Gabbra and Borana, which has led to displacement of people, to much exchange of gun-fire, to banditry and robberies, as well as to the effective closure of many pasture areas for reasons of security. There have obviously been numerous efforts of peace organizations to stop the violence, but people in Dukana complained that "peace is never honoured". A recent attempt by the "Pastoralist Communication Initiative" seems to have overcome the reluctance of both sides to end the hostilities, resulting in a number of local agreements. Remains it to be seen how reliable this new initiative proves to be, as nevertheless there still are hurt feelings on both sides and scores to settle.

Impact of Conflict on Project Implementation

Since the primary objective of the overall ICRD project, extending from Northern Uganda through Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia eastwards to Somalia, had been defined as "to reduce the impact of drought on the livelihoods of the targeted vulnerable communities", it was clear from the onset that the various local conflicts would affect the opportunities for the implementation of activities. The project proposal clearly stated the risks of insecurity for the staff, specifying that "this project will expressly target areas of insecurity. One of the key aims of this project is to enable communities to access better and larger areas of grazing land that is currently unaccessible as a result of conflict. Conflict in the areas of operation is largely as a result of live-stock raiding. There are a significant amount of arms in the hands of communities within the project area and the level of risk to project staff is considered predictable but severe." The impact of violent conflict on the eventual success of the project did, however, not relate only to security considerations. On the contrary, chances for the implementation of some of the various activities in these volatile areas immeasurably demanded a cessation of hostilities. Since the improvement of drought preparedness included the access to additional water resources and grazing areas, the conclusion of agreements was seen as a prerequisite for the community-based development of coping mechanisms against droughts, and so peace-building became one of the aspects of the "Improved Community Response to Drought" project. Only the acceptance of reciprocal grazing agreements would allow VSF to promote the improvement of feeding mechanisms for the animals of the affected population and to invest in the rehabilitation of wells. Even the provision of veterinary services would be affected by opportunities for the movement of animals, as experience has shown that diseases could spread much quicker when animals are kept in confinement.

Despite the obvious success that the project has achieved, violent conflict has indeed affected all areas in which the VSF consortium has worked and has led to the delay of many activities. For the sector in which VSF Germany has operated, this has had the following impact, as stated in the final evaluation: 12

The meetings of the “Pastoralist Communication Initiative”, which took place in June and July 2009 at various locations in Northern Kenya and which involved a big number of people from the Gabbra and Borana communities on both sides of the border, are very well documented (see www.pastoralists.org) and have obviously achieved a remarkable change in relationships. Unfortunately, no concrete information was obtained from the informants in Dukana about these meetings. It seems, however, that the “Pastoralist Communication Initiative” has built its intervention on the same local efforts of the communities that had also been supported by VSF and by the Catholic Mission and which had resulted in a number of reciprocal grazing and water access agreements. 13

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13 ICRD Project Proposal, page 13

GITHINJI & MURSAL, page 14

“Conflicts prevented access to grazing resources … In Oromia cluster, conflicts over resources existed between the Dasanach, Gabbra, Albore and Hamar Koke that prevented access to grazing resources in the project areas of Buluk and Kudite.”

"Vaccination was delayed in Ileret due to intercommunity raids between Dasanach Ethiopia and Gabbra Kenya."

Even the field visit for this documentation was slightly affected by tensions that had newly erupted due to a case of cattle rustling, involving the Gabbra community and raiders from Ethiopia. As a result of this and some suspicions about possible involvement from the side of the Dasanach community in Kenya, a common workshop with Gabbra and Dasanach in North Hior was not seen as appropriate at the time of the visit. Instead, the information for this documentation had to be collected through separate meetings with the Gabbra community in Dukana and with the Dasanach community in Ileret. Although the issues seems to have settled quickly, the incident nevertheless showed how dependent the work of international organizations can be on the level of conflict between and among the target groups.

In addition to the fact that implementation can be impeded by local violence, this documentation also looks at the degree to which – vice versa – the work of an international organization can influence the level of conflict. Based on the concept of the “Do No Harm” approach, explained in detail in the following chapter, programming decisions could reinforce tensions in their area of operation or contribute to peaceful co-existence. In a critique of past interventions on drought response and preparedness in Kenya, for example, several examples were found, such as:

- “it was observed that emergency interventions can promote peace or fuel conflicts at the same time. This is because it involves resources and most conflicts are resource based.”

- “Conflicts undermine development and accelerate the onset of emergencies, especially where huge tracks of grazing land act as buffer zone between warring communities. A good example can be found among the Gabbra and Borana in Oromiya cluster where large expanse of grazing land acts as a buffer between the two communities who are normally in conflicts over water and pasture.”

- “As a result, the youth have become ‘irrelevant’ in the social context, unable to gain recognition and resources to marry and attend to their social status. Their energy is easily vented in conflicts especially given lack of guidance by parents and the society at large. Although NGOs have been addressing conflicts, they are yet to tackle the youths as a potential source of conflicts.”

- “NGO emergency interventions could cause resentments when resources are too few and favoursitism is used to target beneficiaries.”

The fact that being a beneficiary of outside assistance may put somebody into the focus of attention and of jealousy – and, thus, potentially in danger – was very well understood by the Dasanach community. Without even been asked a respective question, herdsmen in Surge expressed the expectation that, seeing the development of the well in Had Hushumba, the neighbouring Hamar community, with whom they had been in conflict again and again, might “also demand water”.

14 GITHINJI, pages 29-30
Theoretical Background

Summary of the “Do No Harm” Approach

History and Background of the Local Capacities for Peace Project

In late 1994 the Local Capacities for Peace Project was launched to answer the question:

How may aid be provided in conflict settings in ways that, rather than feeding into and exacerbating the conflict, help local people disengage from the violence that surrounds them and begin to develop alternative systems for addressing the problems that underlie the conflict?

The Local Capacities for Peace Project is a collaborative effort, organized by the Collaborative for Development Action in Cambridge, Massachusetts, involving a number of donor agencies, international NGOs and local aid workers. The approach taken was inductive, learning from local field experiences. Thus, fifteen case studies were conducted in fourteen conflict zones to examine the interactions of aid and conflict. From the cases, lessons-to-date were compiled in a booklet entitled Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace through Aid. This booklet formed the basis for over twenty-five feedback workshops carried out with aid workers in a number of countries in which they “tested” the lessons against their own experience, added to and amended them and, thus, improved them. The learning from the entire effort is now published in a book entitled Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War, (Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder, Colorado).

The word “conflict” here refers to negative, destructive (often violent) group interactions rather than to the variety of inter-group disagreements or other forms of constructive struggle by which social change occurs. It is for this reason that the thrust of the “Do No Harm” message of how aid and conflict interact is to push for aid agencies not to worsen conflict. The point, however, is not to avoid inter-group struggles or social change. Clearly, in all societies in the world, injustice continues to exist and aid organizations must be continuously engaged in working for greater, inclusive justice. The focus here is on how they can be aware of, and avoid inadvertently worsening destructive interactions that do not serve to promote and strengthen justice.

In addition, the “Do No Harm” approach is not directed toward urging aid agencies to change or add to their mandates and become, also, peace agencies. Rather, the focus is on how aid agencies – both those that provide emergency assistance and those that are involved in supporting development – can do what they do best (relief and development) and, at the same time, ensure that their aid does nothing to worsen conflicts and helps local people find options and alternatives to conflict.

Characteristics of Conflict Areas

The Context of Conflict

It has to be noted that any context of conflict is characterized by two sets of things – divisions, tensions and capacities for war on the one hand and connectors or local capacities for peace on the other hand. At this point, this means going to turn to more detail about how to identify and understand the divisions, tensions and war capacities.

A first step in doing this is to understand the context of conflict by identifying who is divided in any particular conflict area. In all areas, there are a number of inter-group or interpersonal tensions and differences. Programme planners need not be equally interested in all of these; many represent healthy pluralism and dif-

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16 This chapter is adapted from the “Summary of the Local Capacities for Peace Framework”, developed by the Local Capacities for Peace Project in the Horn of Africa and itself based on various documents published by Mary B. Anderson and the Collaborative for Development Action.
identifying dividers / sources of tension

in addition, very often there are people who have an interest in warfare and who gain from it. there are also structures and systems that represent capacities for dividing people. these are the war capacities that the “do no harm” approach refers to. once the groups that are in, or potentially in, conflict are identified, then the focus should move to understanding the divisions, tensions and war interests. the following categories were found useful for understanding divisions, tensions and war capacities:

systems and institutions

for example, the ways in which actors in a conflict situation are organized. armed groups might be formed in situations where the central government is weak. police departments can be organized to use one group to police another. legal systems can discriminate against the rights of one group. wells and power systems can be controlled by one side of a conflict.

attitudes and actions

for example, the violent acts that daily maintain the tensions in a society such as raids, village attacks and ambushes; or the acts that explicitly target one group. these can be the police stopping one group at a checkpoint while letting another group go through, or the denial of market access by inhibiting livestock to pass through a particular area. racism can also be included into this category of dividers.

different values and interests

for example, agriculturalists and pastoralists treat land use very differently. also, religious values can be used to promote dividers, such as religious laws that are imposed on people not of that religion.

different experiences

for example, history can be selectively used to highlight the times when groups were fighting one another rather than referring to times when they cooperated. conflicts can also arise out of situations where groups have very different lifestyles, whether those differences are religious or economic, etc.

symbols and occasions

for example, one group can impose their holidays on the other. or, alternately, they can prevent a holiday from being observed. monuments might be destroyed or boundaries crossed.

identifying connectors / local capacities for peace

in addition to the more obvious dividers, tensions or war capacities, contexts of conflict are also characterized by connectors or local capacities for peace. it is important, always, to remember that:

• more countries do not go to war than do.
• more people, even in war zones, do not fight than do.
• more people do not kill their neighbours than do.
• more would-be leaders try to excite people to inter-group violence than succeed in doing so.

that is, non-war is, apparently, more common and more “natural” than war. there are many ways that people manage differences, disagreements, suspicions, etc. other than through destructive or violent conflict. however, one should not be too optimistic about capacities for peace or connectors. in a society where open conflict does erupt, these are clearly not strong enough or effective enough to prevent violence. they have failed by definition. nonetheless, they have existed and some still exist; they provide a base on which future non-war or peace can be constructed. even in the midst of warfare, especially in situations of civil war where former fellow-citizens are fighting each other, there continue to exist a whole series of things that connect people who are fighting. these include:

systems and institutions

for example, in all societies where civil war breaks out, markets continue to connect people across the lines of fighting. sometimes these involve formal inter-enemy trade; sometimes they involve women meeting at the market by the river-side one morning a week. communications systems can provide linkages (for example, many people report that they value the bbc – or, in ethiopia, the “deutsche welle” – because they know that everyone on all sides of a war can hear the same information about what is happening); in some cases, irrigation systems, bridges, roads and electrical grids connect people in spite of war (in some cases, they are destroyed by warriors intent on separating people).

attitudes and actions

for example in the midst of war, one finds individuals and groups who continue to express attitudes of tolerance, acceptance, even love or appreciation for people on the “other side”. some individuals still act in non-war ways, doing things that the war would dictate were wrong such as adopting abandoned children of the “other side” or hiding neighbours who are in danger. some are even linking across lines to conduct a professional association or journal, or are setting up new associations of people opposed to the war. they do these things because they seem “normal” or “right”. often, they do not think of them as extraordinary or, even, as non-war.

shared values and interests

for example, the common value placed on children’s health has been the basis for unicef’s success in negotiating days of tranquility for inoculations against childhood diseases. sometimes a common religion can bring people together.

common experiences

for example, war itself can provide linkages among different sides. citing the experience of war and suffering as “common to all sides”, people sometimes create new anti-war alliances across boundaries.

symbols and occasions

for example, stories abound of the soldiers in the trenches in world war i who, on christmas eve began to sing “silent night” together, and then, they returned to war. national art, music, historical anniversaries, national holidays, monuments can bring people together or link them across differences.

these five categories are not meant to be conceptually tight and mutually exclusive; rather, they are meant to open up the minds of aid workers so that they actually see how many things do continue to connect people even in warfare. to be able to recognize these and support them offers options for aid programmers in conflict settings.

every society has both individuals and systems that prevent every disagreement from breaking out into war and that help contain and move away from violence if it begins. these include justice and legal systems, police forces, implicit codes of conduct, elders groups, church or civic leaders, etc. the roles of conflict prevention and mediation are assigned to some people and institutions in every society. these are what the “do no harm” approach calls capacities for peace.

one should, however, be cautious against “easy” identification of connectors or peace capacities. for example, many people assume that “women’s groups” are connectors or peace capacities, but experience shows that women’s groups can either be connectors or deeply committed dividers. similarly, churches can serve to connect groups or they can serve to divide. one must always look, in context, for who is being connected and who is being divided and how this is occurring in order to do this analysis accurately. if people within
one group are being effectively “connected” in order to oppose other groups with greater strength, it would be a mistake to identify this connection as one that is promoting inter-group harmony.

**Aid’s Impact on Conflict**

**Unpacking the Aid Programme**

To highlight all of the elements that, together, make up a field level assistance programme, and to encourage programme staff to look carefully at all the aspects of their own aid programmes as a step toward analysing their impacts on the context, it is necessary to unpack the aid programme. Here it should be noted that every one of the following elements involves decisions made at headquarters and/or field levels and that each decision has the potential to affect whether and how the aid programme interacts with the context of conflict:

**General Questions**
- Mandate?
- Headquarters Arrangements?
- Fundraising Policy and Effectiveness?

**Planning Questions**
- Why?
- Where?
- What?
- When / How Long?
- For Whom (beneficiaries)?
- With Whom (local partners)?
- By Whom (staff)?
- How (strategies, approaches)?

Past work with agencies providing aid in conflict has found very clear patterns in the ways through which aid interacts with conflict. Rather than causing discouragement by the repetitiveness of these patterns, this finding offers new opportunities, because if it is possible to identify patterns of relationships, then it should also be possible to anticipate them in different settings. If it can be anticipated how aid affects conflict, then there is an opportunity to think of ways to avoid the negative, reinforcing impacts and encourage the positive, conflict-reducing impacts. Aid interacts with conflict through two media:

1. **Resource Transfers**
   - All aid programmes involve the transfer of some resources – cash, food, health care, training, capacity building, etc. Experience has shown that when outside resources are introduced into a resource-scarce environment where people are in conflict with each other, the local people see these resources as representing power and wealth and, thus, they become a part of the conflict. People in conflict attempt to control and use aid resources to support their side of the conflict and to weaken the other side.

2. **Implicit Ethical Messages**
   - Additionally, the ways in which it is offered, aid carries a series of implicit messages that, also, have an effect on conflict.

**Resource Transfers**

There are five patterns by which resources could feed into, prolong and worsen conflict. These include:

**Allocation Effects**

Very often aid goods are stolen by warriors to support the war effort either directly (as when food is stolen to feed fighters), or indirectly (as when food is stolen and sold in order to raise money to buy weapons).

**Market Effects**

Aid affects prices, wages and profits and can either reinforce the war economy (enriching activities and people that are war-related) or the peace economy (reinforcing “normal” civilian production, consumption and exchange).

**Distribution Effects**

When aid is targeted to some groups and not to others, and these groups exactly (or even partially) overlap with the divisions represented in the conflict, aid can reinforce and exacerbate conflict. Aid can also reinforce connectors by crossing and linking groups by the ways it is distributed.

**Substitution Effects**

Aid can substitute for local resources that would have been used to meet civilian needs and, thus, free these up to be used in support of war. There is a political substitution effect that is equally important. This occurs when international agencies assume responsibility for civilian survival to such an extent that this allows local leaders and warriors to define their roles solely in terms of warfare and control through violence. As the aid agencies take on support of non-war aspects of life, such leaders can increasingly abdicate any responsibility for these activities.

**Legitimization Effects**

Aid legitimizes some people and some actions and weakens or side-lines others. It can support either those people and actions that pursue war, or those that pursue and maintain non-war (peace).

**Implicit Ethical Messages**

While aid carries the explicit message of caring for the needy, the way aid is given does also transfer some implicit messages. The organisations working on the development of the “Do No Harm” approach identified seven types of negative implicit ethical messages. It should be noted that, while it is clear that the impacts of aid through resource transfers can be quite important for conflict, it is much less clear about the actual impacts of the seven implicit ethical messages described below. However, these ideas have come from aid workers who think they are quite important; they do not come from some “external evaluation” of how aid gets it wrong! Thus, it seems useful and even essential to consider them carefully and think about own experiences with this kind of impact.

**Arms and Power**

When aid agencies hire armed guards to protect their goods from theft or their workers from harm, the implicit ethical message perceived by those in the context is that it is legitimate for arms to determine who gets access to food and medical supplies and that security and safety derive from weapons.

**Disrespect, Mistrust, Competition among Aid Agencies**

When aid agencies refuse to cooperate with each other, and even worse “bad-mouth” each other (saying things such as “we don’t work the way they work; we are better and they get it wrong”), the message received by those in the area is that it is unnecessary to cooperate with anyone with whom one does not agree. Further, you don’t have to respect or work with people you don’t like.

**Aid Workers and Impunity**

When aid workers use the goods and support systems provided as aid to people who suffer for their own pleasures and purposes (as when they take the vehicle to the mountains for a weekend holiday even though petrol is scarce), the message is that if one has control over resources, it is permissible to use them for personal benefit without being accountable to anyone else who may have a claim on these resources.

**Different Value for Different Life**

When aid agency policies allow for evacuation of expatriate staff if danger occurs but not for care of local staff, or even worse, when plans call for removal of vehicles, radios and expatriates while local staff, food and other supplies are left behind, the message is that some lives (and even some goods) are more valuable than other lives.

**Powerlessness**

When field-based aid staff disclaim responsibility for the impacts of their aid programs, saying things such as “You can’t hold me accountable for what happens here; it is my headquarters, or the donor, or these terrible warlords who make my aid have negative impacts”, the message received is...
that individuals in complex circumstances cannot have much power and, thus, they do not have to take responsibility for what they do or how they do it. And, of course, this is what is heard from people involved in civil wars - i.e. “I can’t help what I do; someone else makes me do it.”

**Belligerence, Tension, Suspicion**

When aid workers are nervous about conflict and worried for their own safety to such an extent that they approach every situation with suspicions and belligerence, believing for example that these soldiers at the checkpoint “only understand power” and “can’t be trusted to be human”, their inter-actions with people in war zones very often reinforce the modes and moods of warfare. The message received is that power is, indeed, the broker of human interactions and it is normal to approach everyone with suspicion and belligerence.

**Publicity**

Finally, when NGO headquarters use publicity pictures that emphasize the gruesome nature of warfare and the victimization of parties, they can reinforce the demonization of one side in a war and, thus, reinforce the sense that all people on that side are evil while everyone on another side is an innocent sufferer. This is seldom the case and undermines the humanitarian principle. This, too, can reinforce the modes and moods of warfare rather than helping the public, or the agency’s own staff, find an even-handed way to respond to those on all sides who seek and want peace.

It is important to note that aid workers could also transfer positive implicit ethical messages which would show examples of different behaviours and mentalities. Contrary to the seven messages listed above, these positive messages could be:

- **Non-Violence**
- **Cooperation, Coordination, Use of Synergies**
- **Accountability and Transparency**
- **Equal Concern, Justice, Empathy**
- **Responsibility**
- **Politeness, Confidence, Trust**
- **Balanced Reporting**

**Framework for Programming Options**

**Lessons Learned**

The lessons learned from the “Do No Harm” concept are:

1. That the context of conflict is characterized by two sets of things:
   - The division and tensions between groups and what might be called war interests or capacities for war that most obviously exist in conflict settings.
   - Surprising and far more interesting is the fact that the context of conflict is also characterized by things that connect the sides at war and by what can be called local capacities for peace. The reason this is important (and this should be clearly emphasized) is because everyone expects conflicts to have divisions and tensions and war interests, but not to find connections and peace capacities. Thus, very often, as agencies provide assistance in conflict settings, they inadvertently direct the aid in a way that reinforces the divisions and undermines connections. If programme planners are aware of this, then they can think more clearly about how to design aid programmes in a way that avoid those negative side-effects.

2. When aid is given in the context of conflict, it becomes a part of that context and, as such, either reinforces and exacerbates the divisions and tensions or supports and strengthens the connectors / capacities for peace.

**The Elements of an Aid Program**

Aid programs are multi-layered. Involved in the “package” of aid are headquarters, policy makers and field activities. Aid programs reflect an agency’s mandate, its headquarters arrangements and styles, and its fundraising approaches and successes (or failures). In addition, an aid programme in-volves decisions about whether and why to intervene in a given situation; about when and for how long to do so; about where to work; with whom to work; what kind of staff to hire and how; and finally, about how to carry out the programme. Each of these decisions has its own effects on the divisions / tensions and on connectors / local capacities for peace.

**How Aid Affects Conflict**

From looking at many different projects in many different settings, it has been possible to identify clear predictable patterns of how aid affects conflict. There are two basic ways this occurs:

- through resource transfers: Aid involves provision of some resources and these can become a part of the conflict as groups vie for their share or try to keep others from getting access to them.
- through implicit ethical messages: Aid carries the explicit message of caring about suffering. By the ways in which it is given and the actions of staff, it also carries several implicit or tacit messages and these can affect the context of conflict.

**Programming Options**

It should be noted that, when the impacts of aid on conflict become clear, if some of these are negative (i.e. worsen divisions or weaken connectors), then there are always programming options that can be tried to avoid having these impacts. Or, if the programme seems to be missing opportunities to have a positive effect (i.e. reducing divisions or supporting connectors), there are always options to improve impacts. Experience shows options do exist and that creative aid workers have, in fact, developed many of these that improve projects in context. However, while the patterns by which aid interacts with conflict are predictable and show up across different contexts, the options for ensuring that the impacts are positive rather than negative always must be designed by taking the specific, local circumstances into account. Thus, it is impossible to generalize about “what works”. Using the ideas and clarification of relationships that the Local Capacities for Peace Project has gathered, aid workers can apply them to any local situation and come up with a relevant and appropriate set of ideas for their own circumstances. Nevertheless, any option found to reduce a negative impact or to enhance a positive one must be checked against, again, the other side of the chart. The process of programme design and redesign is a dynamic, rather than static (once and for all), process. Even conflict itself is dynamic so that a “divider” today may be a “connector” tomorrow and vice versa. The tool can and should be used iteratively and repeatedly as a check on programme effects.

**Redesigning the Aid Programme**

Experience shows that aid workers are usually very able to take the “Do No Harm” tools and use them to analyse their situation, and the positive and negative impacts of their aid on conflict. However, very often, even with this awareness, they have difficulty thinking of programming options. There is a strong tendency to think that there is only one way to do things or to assume that the way that programmes have been done in the past cannot be altered.

It is important to keep in mind that most of aid’s impacts on conflict have several dimensions. It was found in many places that it is important first to “unpack” the problem (that is, really analyse why and how aid is having the identified impact) in order to come up with a “package” of solutions that involves several different steps to be taken to address the issue realistically. The way to do this is to use the Framework, looking at a complete aid programme in its context in order to identify all the ways in which that aid programme interacts with the conflict. Once this is clear, then the next step is to think of options, in that context, for delivering the same goods without having the identified negative impact and, where possible, enhancing the positive impacts.
Practical Experiences from Northern Kenya

Description of the Process

The Notion of Conflict at the Planning Stage

This documentation mainly covers the experience gained with the application of the “Do No Harm” approach in a pastoralist environment characterized by violent conflicts between various ethnic groups. It has to be stated, however, that there had been no plan to use this approach in the initial stages of the project. Taking up “Do No Harm” and integrating it into programme planning and implementation was rather a result of careful observations of the developments in the project area and of the personal knowledge and skills of the programme manager, who had undergone a Training of Trainers on the “Do No Harm” approach several years before and had gained personal experience with its application in other positions. This lack of a consistent strategy might have prevented even better results than the ones that have been noticed by the various evaluation teams and been recommended accordingly. They are indeed remarkable.

Project planners had been well aware of the conflict environment in all three areas of the “Improved Community Response to Drought” project, which was to be implemented by a consortium of three different VSF member organizations. Even though the particular dynamics of the situation on the Kenyan-Ethiopian border had not been mentioned specifically, “conflict” had been recognized as the main course of the problem, which would need to be addressed appropriately:

“Whilst the above suggestions are useful, they do little to address the main cause of the problem which is conflict. … A longer term solution needs to be found which will be based on inter community planning and agreements. This solution must come from the communities through capacity building and facilitation in resource planning. Based on this there is an urgent need to facilitate a community driven solution to the problem.”

As a consequence of this realization, the understanding of the context of conflict needed to be of high importance right from the onset of the project, and so the first activities to be done addressing a wide range of inter-dependent issues were defined as:

- Identify key areas of resource based conflict
- Develop a resource utilisation plan (which will allow for reciprocal grazing agreements within and between communities as well as across borders)

The underlying strategy was described as follows:

“The VSF Strategy within the target area addresses the key factors that are constraining community development and driving poverty. The key factors constraining development across the three ecosystems are heavily influenced by recurrent drought and chronic insecurity. The insecurity effectively exacerbates the problems inherent in disequilibrium environments by further reducing access or increasing the risk of access to adequate forages and water in the increasingly frequent and severe dry seasons.”

All this was meant to create an enabling environment for the involvement of the pastoralist communities themselves in the process of developing appropriate strategies to cope with drought. Accordingly, the initial logical framework matrix listed “increased livelihood security through decreased conflict and increased sustainable access to dry season grazing and water” as result no. 1, stating as a precondition that “communities must be willing to resolve past conflicts and to jointly access greater areas of prime grazing land.”

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17 ICRD Project Proposal, page 3
18 ICRD Project Proposal, page 5
19 ICRD Project Proposal, pages 13-15
A critical analysis of this part of the project proposal might in retrospect come to the conclusion that the difficulties in addressing the issue of violent conflict and of the resulting insecurity for the local population and for the programme staff had been underestimated. There was no mentioning at this stage of using the “Do No Harm” methodology in programme planning and implementation, and there was no clarity about how to use the information gained from the identification of “key areas of resource based conflict”. No specific activities were planned with regard to the objective of conflict reduction; instead it seems to have been expected that peace-building would be a quasi-automatic outcome of the planning meetings at community level:

“Note: in all community meetings and training sessions carried out under this project communities will be asked to present suggestions to resolving the growing problems associated with livestock raiding.”

At a later stage in the development of the project intervention, the sequence in the logical framework matrix was changed, and the issue of conflict reduction was taken out of result no. 1, putting the emphasis now on “increased sustainable access to dry season grazing and water” alone. Along with gender sensitivity, consideration for HIV/AIDS and the understanding of a relief-rehabilitation-development continuum, resource-based conflict mitigation became a cross-cutting issue instead. While this could have had the advantage of including conflict-sensitive questions in all decisions concerning the implementation of activities, it remains unclear in how far this has actually taken place. From the description of the underlying expectations it seems that still the automatism of reaching agreements through the organization of community meetings was held up:

“A key secondary benefit of the resource use planning will be the development of agreements between communities. These agreements are likely to reduce conflict over key resources as each community understands its rights of access and accepts the consequences of breaking these agreements. The plans will be developed with both elders and key opinion leaders of each age sect in order to ensure that decisions and agreements are respected at all levels of community society. This, similar to other aspects of this project has considerable opportunity for replication in the future once proved successful.”

Step by Step towards “Do No Harm”

As suggested in the initial proposal, the project of VSF Germany on the Kenyan-Ethiopian border started with resource mapping in a participatory manner. During this first step, the existing pasture areas, settlements, wells, markets and administrative centres were mapped. At the same time, the “conflict areas” were highlighted, which were identified as Buluk, Sabare and Darate for the areas inhabited by the Dasanach and the Gabbra. In the case of the stretch along the Ethiopian border between Buluk and Sabare, fertile pasture areas are considered inaccessible by both ethnic groups due to unclear territorial claims, which resulted in the avoidance of the area on security grounds. The case of Darate is a bit more complicated, as the restrictions in connection with the establishment of the Sibiloi National Park had prevented both the Dasanach and the Gabbra of entering into the area and accessing the shore of Lake Turkana. Trespassing of herders has antagonized the local population and the Kenya Wildlife Service, and both ethnic groups have been affected by the loss of dry-season grazing areas for wildlife conservation purposes.

Immediately after the resource mapping exercise on community level, a baseline survey was conducted, in which data was collected about various issues that the project was going to address, such as the nutritional status of the population, the effectiveness of existing animal health care services, levels and patterns of trade, the existence of emergency plans, the functioning of social support structures, the status of livestock and the vulnerability of local community members. Again, the collection of data in the baseline survey revealed more information on the level of conflict, the causes for the differences among the various ethnic groups and the impact this had on the availability of water and forage resources.

20 ICRD Project Proposal, page 16
21 ICRD Second Intermediate Report, page 18
22 ICRD Second Intermediate Report, page 52

According to the original plan, the next step should have been the organization of inter-community meetings for the purpose of achieving agreements on the utilization of resources. At this stage, the programme staff had realized that the issue of violent conflict might be a more serious obstacle for the implementation of activities than anticipated. As long as Dasanach and Gabbra were viewing each other with deep suspicions and as long as the entering into the disputed areas was considered an almost suicidal endeavour, there was no chance for the effective implementation of all subsequent activities. It was at this stage that the “Do No Harm” approach was introduced into the process, aiming at an attitude change among the population involved.

The first “Do No Harm” workshop was conducted in Buluk, at one of the disputed locations between the two communities. During this two-days meeting, the “Do No Harm” approach was presented to a small group of participants from the Gabbra and the Dasanach plus the local programme staff, for whom the concept had been new so far. During the first session, the facilitator referred to a successful example of the application of the approach in an area of Western Kenya where Nandi and Luo communities had started common activities after long years of fighting, which then served as a model for the participants. These were coming from various sub-groups within the society, such as peace committee representatives, chiefs, councilors, herdsmen and elders, accompanied by youth representatives who might in fact have doubled as local security guards. As a result of the workshop, which also encouraged participants to exercise the concept on the local situation, the potential opportunities of working together were discovered by the representatives of the Gabbra and Dasanach communities, and the need for peace-building as a secondary result of the whole programme was identified.

Few weeks later, the second “Do No Harm” workshop brought together more than 60 people for three days at Sabare, strategically located at the Kenyan-Ethiopian border in the “no man’s land” between the Dasanach and the Gabbra on the Kenyan side, and at the same time within easy reach for Hamar, Albo and Borana on the Ethiopian side. The security of the representatives from the various ethnic groups was guaranteed by the presence of a unit of the Kenyan police, who maintain a training camp at Sabare. Community leaders and church representatives from all ethnic groups participated together with government officials from two Kenyan districts and three Ethiopian woredas, as well as three staff members of VSF. In this workshop, the facilitator selected only a part of the “Do No Harm” approach for the training, particularly addressing the analysis of the local conflict situation and the options for cooperation. Additionally, people were invited to develop a visioning matrix, in which alternative ways for the development of the region were drafted.

The feedback from the two workshops was immensely positive, and the impact on the relationship between the various groups was astonishing. As a result, not only were reciprocal grazing agreements reached, but additionally cross-border committees were established and water users associations were set up. Even though limited exposure and unrealistic expectations were observed by VSF staff, this meant the creation of first structures for project implementation on community level. It was agreed that training of members on technical issues was conducted, in all community meetings and training sessions carried out under this project communities will be asked to present suggestions to resolving the growing problems associated with livestock raiding.
should always be combined with peace-building issues, as it was realized that peace and development be-
long closely together. Most surprisingly, however, the former arch-enemies from the Gabbra and Dasanach communities started joint activities as a direct result from the two “Do No Harm” workshops. The unused well in Buluk was rehabilitated by artisans from both communities together, and furthermore own initiatives were started with respect to the search for indigenous solutions in cases of conflict.

A third gathering between Gabbra and Dasanach in-
volved a meeting of water users associations from both communities and was held in North Horr. This meeting analysed the existing attitudes and decided on the institutionalization of communication between the two associations (in Kiswahili). Additionally, plans were developed for awareness campaigns among the youths in order to spread the message of peace throughout the vast areas of the two ethnic groups. In the words of the commanding police offer in Ileret, the sequence of meetings from Buluk through Sabare to North Horr was a real “breakthrough” in the relationship between the Gabbra and the Dasanach. The amazing results of the process have also been noted by two evaluation missions. It was found, that “traditionally, community members used to talk about peace in ceremonies and social gatherings” and that “the project built on this.”23 The methodology was particularly recommended, since “the peace building process in Ileret has followed the ‘Do no harm’ approach and was highly effective and took place within a short time (within a period of around 4 months there was one big meeting between the 2 tribes and preparatory meetings on both sides as well common activities after).”24 Finally it was found that “the peace meetings provided the corner stone for planning all other activities. However, the limited time and budget given to peace building, conflict resolution and actualization of the community action plans was a limitation.”25

Utilization of “Do No Harm” Components

Understanding the Context

While the “Do No Harm” approach is usually presented in a sequence of about ten separate modules, not all of those are equally useful for particular audiences. Depending on the type of participants, more emphasis might be given to the analysis of the context, or to programming decisions, or to the interaction between aid and conflict, or even to developing options for avoiding negative side-effects. Accordingly, this documentation tries to find out what were the particular elements of the “Do No Harm” approach that caught the attention of the local people in the project area and that caused such remarkable effects.

The first step in using the “Framework for Considering the Impact of Aid on Conflict” is the analysis of the context of conflict. This step aims at understanding the magnitude of different conflict issues, the extent to which differences have turned into wide-spread violence, the causes of conflict, potentially the different levels of conflict that take place at the same time, as well as the affected locations and population groups. Questions raised in the two workshops at Buluk and at Sabare were:

- conflict state / fear / tension?
- who is involved?
- where?
- what is the interest of the group?
- type of conflict?

Sometimes it is useful to borrow elements from other peace-building tools to further illustrate the context of conflict. One such tool, which has proved helpful in other instances, is “conflict mapping”. Although this has never been applied within the VSF programme along the Kenyan-Ethiopian border, a sketch map of the conflict situation in the area is presented here in order to better understand the dynamics. For a similar purpose, the participants at both the Buluk and the Sabare workshops were referring to the resource mapping done several months before. In conflict settings where there are several parallel lines of conflict at the same time, the session on the understanding of the context is particularly important, as it helps programme planners to define which of those are relevant at a particular location and to relate the subsequent analysis to a specific context.

Looking back at the responses from the group work sessions, it is evident that the discussions about the issues of conflict served as an eye-opener about the different perceptions of the various ethnic groups. While the meetings as such were already considered a success in itself, the sessions on the context of conflict created opportunities to learn from each other, to understand causes and actions, and to recognize existing mechanisms for conflict resolution. The discovery of different perceptions led to a willingness to change, and the focus on the situation at a particular location added a practical aspect to this discussion.

On the other hand, the differences in education levels and exposure affected the quality of the responses from the group work, so that some important actors in the conflict were overlooked. Another potential danger can be seen in the fact that, in Sabare, one particular ethnic group (the Gabbra) ended up being in the spotlight of everybody else.

Analysis of Relationships

The second and third steps of the “Framework for Considering the Impact of Aid on Conflict” analyse the relationships between two groups that are involved in a violent conflict. While there are the more obvious things that divide the two parties, there still exists a number of other things that continue to connect the two groups, even if there are not strong enough to prevent the fighting. It is one of the most prominent aspects of the “Do No Harm” approach that it recognizes these connectors (or “Local Capacities for Peace”) alongside the more obvious dividers, and that a closer look at the two goes beyond the notion of actors and includes all kinds of attitudes and behaviours, value systems and experiences in the analysis.

In many workshops on the “Do No Harm” approach, the analysis of dividers and connectors is first done on a case study from a distant setting. This has the advantage that workshop participants can look at the methodology without being personally involved in the underlying context of conflict. In Buluk and in Sabare, however, the analysis turned straight into the sensitive issues of conflict between the different ethnic groups. Another setting – that of Songhor in Western Kenya – was presented as a model on how other ethnic groups

23 GITHINSI & MURSAL, page 19
24 HARTUNG: Technical Appraisal No. 06
25 GITHINSI & MURSAL, page 14
in Kenya have managed to successfully overcome their differences, but this case was not used for the analytical exercise.

So, the first workshop in Buluk analysed the various categories of dividers and connectors between the Gabbr and the Dasanach, while the second workshop in Sabare allowed participants to list down all kinds of examples from the various contexts of conflict around the Kenyan-Ethiopian border. The questions asked were:

- **Determine the dividers / causes of tension in the area in terms of:**
  - Systems and Institutions
  - Different Attitudes and Actions
  - Different Values and Interests
  - Different Past Experiences
  - Symbols

- **Write the existing connectors in the area in line with the five categories of classification:**
  - Institutions and Systems
  - Shared Attitudes and Actions
  - Shared Values and Interests
  - Shared Experiences
  - Common Symbols

The facilitator observed that the personal involvement of the participants was bringing out much bitterness during the discussion about dividers, which could have been challenging for the continuation of the process. Another difficulty in the utilization of the categories resulted from the lack of disaggregation, showing up, for example, when the police and the church were listed as institutions both among the dividers and among the connectors. As observed in many other workshops before, the facilitator needs to assist here by carefully directing participants to realize that there may be certain aspects related to such an institution that divide and others that connect. Through the application of the five categories, these specifications can be brought out. The experience from the Buluk and the Sabare workshops showed that the disaggregation helps thinking ahead, leading participants to surprising conclusions (“in the end, the boundary is not important”).

The working groups on connectors yielded many surprising facts for the workshop participants, both in Buluk and in Sabare, particularly when the representatives of the various communities noticed that they have much more in common than what they expected. Many shared values and interests were listed, the creation of social services was appreciated by all sides, and the existence of shared resources brought everyone to the realization that development needs cooperation. People also noticed that, while the simple people on both sides – such as the livestock herders – are in fact all victims of the on-going violence, there are also common traditions promoting conflict. So, how could these traditions be transformed into something positive?

From the perspective of one of the VSF staff members among the participants, the introduction of a new terminology was a decisive innovation that made people look at their situation with a new vision. During the field visit for this documentation, this impression was confirmed in the meetings with community members in Ileret, who could not only refer to the categories of dividers and connectors easily, but were even able to cite examples from the workshops several months earlier. As in many other occasions, this new terminology has left a lasting impression on the workshop participants.

### Unpacking the Programme Components

**Based on the thorough analysis of the conflict scenario and of the underlying relationships, the fourth step of the “Framework for Considering the Impact of Aid on Conflict” is meant to look at the details of an aid programme.** This follows the understanding that any relief or development intervention brought into a situation of violent conflict becomes part and parcel of that context and that all decisions taken on the programming level might have a positive or negative impact on the setting. Since very rarely a programme is bad as a whole, there might be particular details that actually have a negative side-effect. The process of “unpacking” is supposed to reveal these details that may result from an organization’s identity (mandate, headquarter arrangements, fundraising policies) or from concrete planning decisions on the ground.

During the workshop in Buluk, which went through all aspects of the “Do No Harm” approach, the process of unpacking was presented, but did not leave a lasting impression. The most probable reason for this might be the fact that the workshop participants had no previous experience with project planning, so that the various questions that are usually asked in the process of developing a project proposal or during the implementation of activities were rather unfamiliar. What was highlighted, however, was the existence of different types of service providers which finds its expression in the various ways how organizations operate.

In the Buluk workshop, there was one interesting example on how individual perceptions can play a role in the building-up of tensions and in the development of prejudices, when the Dasanach reported about the bias of the Catholic Church towards the Gabbr. To justify this impression, it was explained that the Gabbr in North Horr receive all kinds of services for free, while the Dasanach in Ileret need to contribute with own resources. While this was considered unjust and favouring one side in a conflict, the underlying reason was simply that the Catholic Mission in North Horr, which had started work in the 1960s, had taken up more of a charity approach at that time, while the new mission in Ileret followed a more modern approach of promoting self-help capacities for development. Alas, the perception of the local people was based on other kinds of impressions.

In the second workshop at Sabare, the unpacking of programme components was not used.

### Interaction between Aid and Conflict

Having understood the many details that make up an aid programme, the fifth step of the “Framework for Considering the Impact of Aid on Conflict” helps programme planners and implementers to understand the mechanisms through which their decisions or their behaviour interacts with the two sides of the conflict. This interaction takes place through the effects of resource transfers or through implicit ethical messages. Both mechanisms were explained and discussed in plenary in the workshop in Buluk only.

The discussion about the effects of resource transfers brought out several relevant examples how the provision of aid had resulted in certain reactions from the side of the affected communities. While not all of these examples referred to a particular conflict setting, the essential logic behind these effects seems to have been well understood by the participants, since they cited local examples from Ileret about influences of food aid on market prices, about the consequences of targeting particular groups or involving specific individuals, about the diversion of resources, or about undermining self-help capacities. It would have been more interesting, however, to look at the potential effects that the programme’s decisional effects might have, though the participants of the Buluk workshop might not have been the right group of people for this exercise.

For all those involved in the planning and implementation of activities, these questions would need to be asked, however. This applies in particular for all the local staff of VSF (of whom some were attending the Buluk workshop), but also for those representatives of the communities that form part of the programming process according to the participatory orientation of the project. It is not clear to what extent this might have been adopted, as their has not been any systematic application of this part of the “Do No Harm” approach so far, but common sense has raised some of the relevant issues, as can be concluded from the following quotes:

**Photo 11**

Small market at Sabare - a new connector?
“VSF does not work in North Horr, because there are others.”

(about previous experience) “In cooperation with Sudan Radio Services, VSF G aired every week on short wave radio programmes of interest for pastoralists. Peace, Human Health, Livestock Market Information, Animal Health and News were the topics for the broadcasting. As aired in Toposa / Turkana language, the messages could be received at both sides of the border. It has eased tensions between the two tribes and has created bridges.”

“There is a risk that by mapping traditional livestock movements and creating agreements on traditional land use, these agreements will become cast in stone and eventually be the cause of future conflict. … Experience has also shown that, when the process is rushed and negotiation of intercommunity agreements is left to selected village elders, the agreements themselves can be a source of conflict.”

Unfortunately, the discussion about implicit ethical messages during the Buluk workshop was not satisfactory. All examples quoted referred to attitudes and behaviour of community members, while this part of the “Do No Harm” approach is originally meant to check on the messages that the staff of organizations intentionally or unintentionally transfer through the way they act.

Developing Options

The last two steps of the “Framework for Considering the Impact of Aid on Conflict” are supposed to be used in case that programme activities show any signs of negative side-effects. Through the redesign of the programme and the testing of options, the unintentional reinforcement of dividers or weakening of connectors should be prevented.

Based on the fact that VSF had only recently started to work in Ileret, there was no opportunity yet for the workshop participants in Buluk and in Sabare to reflect on negative side-effects of programming decisions and to suggest possible adaptations. Instead the methodology was used as a brainstorming exercise on possible actions that the programme could adopt in order to promote the linkages between the various communities. Some of the suggestions from the workshop in Buluk included:

- agreement on reciprocal use of pasture areas
- joint rehabilitation / construction of wells to be built by artisans from both communities
- construction of shared markets
- establishment of a joint training centre
- building of shared churches and mosques
- start of sport activities and exchange programmes

Thinking of the astonishing suggestions that came out of this discussion, it must be concluded that, while the analysis of the context and the categorization of dividers and connectors has resulted in a mutual understanding of each other’s perceptions and needs, the development of programming options has linked this to a highly practical purpose. Since VSF has not hesitated to support some of the suggested activities, people have obviously felt taken seriously, which explains the positive feedback the whole process has received. Most probably, it was this obvious link between peace and development that was attractive for the local population.

27 Eunice Obala during the community meeting in Ileret on July 12, 2009
28 ICRD Project Proposal, page 7
29 ICRD Project Proposal, page 33

Incorporation of Other Methodological Components

Participatory Planning

While the “Do No Harm” approach had only been adopted into the programming of VSF’s “Improved Community Response to Drought” project when the dependence of effective implementation on some kind of peace-building became apparent, the need for a strong participation of the local communities in finding appropriate solutions for drought preparedness was considered from the beginning. This involvement was even regarded as a particular innovation for similar interventions in pastoralist areas, and so VSF followed a clearly-defined strategy of participatory development. This strategy has been excellently explained in a set of posters developed for the public awareness on the project purpose:

“VSFG uses a participatory approach in designing and implementing its interventions in the communities.”

Developing Options

Although there seems to have been only a “limited community participation at the planning stage” and “participation of key stakeholders was noted to have been limited or absent at the time of project conceptualization”30, these initial shortcomings were soon corrected once the project got on the way. And as a result, the final project evaluation mentions several examples about the degree of ownership and self-responsibility of the pastoralist field schools or of the village community banks. It is expected that these structures will be able to work in the future without further assistance, and it was found remarkable that “the members have exhibited strong sense of belonging, cohesiveness, confidence and self will in their activities”.31

Very often it has been suggested to combine the conflict-sensitive “Do No Harm” approach with participatory planning methods, and this has obviously been achieved in this project. The programme manager deserves the particular credit of having creatively dealt with both methodologies and having developed a combined concept that may serve as a model for future replication. The following components of participatory planning have been used, either in conjunction with the “Do No Harm” approach or in other ways:

- **Resource Use Maps** were already used during the initial stages of the project. This mapping exercise allowed the local communities to analyse existing resources, boundaries and conflict zones. During the drawing of the map and its subsequent presentation, VSF staff was able to extract information about temporary and permanent water sources, about grazing patterns and migratory routes to markets

30 VSFG Poster Series: Improved Community Response to Droughts (ICRD) – A General Overview
31 GITHINJI & MURSAL, pages 16-17
32 HARTUNG: Technical Appraisal No. 07
and pasture areas, about settlements and boundaries. The resource mapping finally created entry points for conflict analysis and for further mapping exercises.

- **Proportionate Scoring Matrices and Pairwise Ranking** were used as analytical instruments to determine which problems were considered the most serious. The scoring techniques were applied during the planning on the individual village level. Combined with the questionnaires used during baseline data collection, this helped to understand the dynamics in the area.

- **Project Zoning** helped arrive at decisions about the specific locations of high risk areas, where a specific need for the application of the “Do No Harm” approach existed and where perhaps additional peace-building interventions would be necessary.

- **Listening, Negotiation, Bargaining and Self-Actualization / Discovery Skills** were applied at community meetings held in preparation for the inter-community meetings, during which participants would have to present their causes to representatives of the neighbouring ethnic groups.

- **Seasonal Calendar** was helpful in understanding the seasonal fluctuations that affect the communities in the area through differences in work load, in scarcity of food and water, in availability of income opportunities, or with regard to the occurrence of diseases. This overview also showed at which times of the year the local population would actually be able to actively participate in programme activities. The seasonal calendar was used during the planning of activities and in conflict analysis, since it was found that violent raids were more common after the rains when communities were less involved in other activities.

- **Wealth Ranking** gave an insight into the social stratification within the pastoralist communities in the area. This helped understand community perceptions of wealth, potential sources of investment and local definitions of “poverty”. Additionally, the internal relationships between rich and poor were found to have a marked impact on conflict issues.

- **Community Action Plans** were developed during community planning meetings to allow the members of the local pastoralist population to take ownership of the development process. Following the identification of problems and the prioritization of possible solutions, strategic interventions were outlined and put into a plan of action. Both the Buluk and the Sabare workshops, which were mainly dealing with the questions arising from the “Do No Harm” approach, eventually arrived at community action plans.

### Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building

As explained above, the issue of violent conflicts was found to be one of the major causes for the vulnerability of the different ethnic groups in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia. For this reason, the inclusion of peace-building was intended to be an integral part of the programme, and experiences with addressing this issue were supposed to lead to valuable conclusions and further recommendations. Main component of this aspect of project implementation were the “reciprocal grazing agreements”, which were expected to result from the inter-community meetings and which were eventually achieved with the help of the two “Do No Harm” workshops.

As one VSF staff member described it, “peace” has in the meantime become the major objective in the minds of the people involved, and there is a clear need for an institution to facilitate and monitor the process. Based on the lack of experience, however, the responsible persons within VSF feel reluctant to focus too much on peace-building and conflict management. So far, peace-building activities have been implemented by common sense rather than through specific skills, and no other specialized organization has been involved.

### Lessons Learned

#### Reflections of the Staff Involved

##### Strategy and Implementation

From all the information received during this documentation assignment, it can clearly be stated that the application of “Do No Harm” has considerably contributed to the successful implementation of the “Improved Community Response to Drought” project in Northern Kenya. Two evaluation missions have highlighted the importance which the peace-building activities of VSF have had on the project, and although the “Do No Harm” approach in its original sense is rather a planning-tool than a peace-building tool, it seems to have been surprisingly well-suited to address the differences between the various ethnic groups, particularly between the Gabbra and the Dasanach. This impression was confirmed by community members in Dukana and in Ilaret, and VSF staff members in the field and at the headquarters all expressed their appreciation of the process.

As mentioned earlier, the use of the “Do No Harm” approach had not been envisaged originally, and so these results are even more surprising. While there had been an explicit strategy for participatory planning approaches, there had been none for conflict sensitivity. The incorporation of the “Do No Harm” approach did then come as a result of observations on conflict at field level and of the personal skills of one individual staff member. It seems that the organization was not well prepared for conflict-sensitive planning, since even the programme manager who eventually introduced the “Do No Harm” approach had not been recruited because of these skills – she was initially supposed to act as a community mobilizer due to her knowledge of participatory planning!

Once the process was under way and first positive reactions had been noted, the value of the “Do No Harm” approach began to be seen. It clearly served as an awareness raising tool that helped change the negative attitudes of the different warring communities towards each other. In the perception of the local community and most of VSF’s staff members, however, it probably still is regarded as a peace-building tool. It is interesting to compare the reactions of three different staff members to the outcome of the workshops in Buluk and Sabare:

- One person, belonging to one of the two communities in conflict and engaged primarily in veterinary health care, is said to have been very reluctant in addressing the differences between Dasanach and Gabbra at all. There obviously was a fear that talking about the experience of violence in joint meetings would be too difficult to handle, and that the whole issue might be too dangerous to touch.

- Another person, working as livestock development officer, particularly recommended in his final report upon resigation the engagement of the project in bringing communities together. There is a feeling, however, that conflict resolution may have been regarded as a separate objective in this case, since there is otherwise no specific mentioning of anything related to “Do No Harm” in the report quoted above. So, the relationship between peace and development may not have been integrated into the implementation of activities in the specific sector of operation.

- A third person, working as water development officer and being an outsider to this pastoralist environment, seems to have been much more receptive to the “Do No Harm” approach. During a site visit to one of the rehabilitated wells in Surge, he explained that, while VSF had come to assist the Dasanach in expanding their pastures, it was found that the promising areas for this expansion were disputed, and that accordingly such an intervention would cause even more tension if implemented without due consideration to the context of conflict. This statement clearly shows the understanding...
of the interrelation between peace and development, and nevertheless: the utilization of the planning questions from the “Do No Harm” approach was not done systematically; rather they were incorpo-rated into common sense.

From the point of view of the facilitator of the two “Do No Harm” workshops (who is at the same time the programme manager in Ileret), the experiences made are very encouraging despite the ad-hoc manner in which the process was done. It became clear that there are opportunities of working with two communities that are in conflict and that it is even necessary to pro-actively address the issues at stake. It might be possi-
ble to get the respect of both communities even though the conflict as such can not be solved, and ordinary members of the community might well be in a position to establish local forms of cooperation when no poli-
ticians are involved.

There were also challenges realized, of course. First, a lot of preparation is necessary to start a “Do No Harm” process where there is still on-going fighting. A close understanding of socio-cultural and economic conditions is equally needed, like knowledge of the topography of the area and skills in trust-building and negotiation. The facilitation itself has to ensure that there is no pin-pointing at particular groups or individual persons. And, in a pastoralist environment, it seems to be difficult to include gender perspectives into the discussions, since most peace meetings are dominated by men – the village community banks and the pastoral field schools might offer better opportunities in this regard.

From a logistic point of view, the two “Do No Harm” workshops put particular challenges to the programme management. Since these workshops were not originally planned – at least not in this way –, there seem to have been some misunderstandings how to secure the necessary funding for them. This may have gone at the expense of profundness. It was discovered in retrospect that a duration of two days (in Buluk, involving twenty people from two communities) or even three days (in Sabare, involving sixty people from five communities) is too short to achieve a deep understanding of the subject. The low level of education, the sensi-
tivity of the subject, and the fact that every contribution has to be translated (sometimes into several other languages) require a slower pace, adapted to the needs of the audience.

The need for sufficient funding of training activities and of inter-community meetings would need to be taken into stronger consideration in future. This does refer not only to the direct work with the communities, but also to the internal training of all staff members, who eventually have to implement the project activities in a conflict-sensitive way, even if they have their core expertise in veterinary health care, livestock market-
ing or water management. Additional resources might also be necessary for the communication of results, as has been recommended by the final evaluation mission:

“To consolidate the gains made through peace meetings, Radio programs in local languages are paramount and should be supported. It disseminates the ratifications and resolutions made in the peace meetings to the wider community.”

Results and Impact

The immediate outcome of the “Do No Harm” workshop in Buluk was a reciprocal agreement on the sharing of pasture and water resources between the Gabbra and the Dasanach, the establishment of joint committees looking at water use and at peace issues, and the planning of common activities. Additionally, the workshop participants lobbed for the organization of a second workshop, involving also the communities from the other side of the Kenyan-Ethiopian border. This workshop was held about a month later in Sabare and helped spreading the idea of development activities as a consequence of establishing peaceful relationships to the Hamar, Alboare and Borana communities.

In almost every workshop, there are plenty of nice declarations and ambitious plans presented during the closing ceremony. Very often, most of the kind words and most of the action plans are forgotten before peo-
ple reach their homes again. In the case of the relationship between the Gabbra and the Dasanach, however, it did not remain at the level of non-binding agreements – instead, local people used the momentum of the

The final evaluation report lists the respective results as follows:

- “5 shallow wells were rehabilitated (deepened, lined and capped), 5 troughs were also con-
 structed in Kadite and Buluk grazing areas to ease tension between Dasanach and the Gabb-
bra.”

- “Livestock and human population are getting water from rehabilitated wells and pumps. Most water points visited served 3000 to 5000 cattle and 2000 sheep and goats on daily basis.”

- “8 artisans were trained in well capping, lining and trough making. … Exchange visits exposed the water artisans from Dasanach community on how other communities deal with water re-
lated problems.”

The final evaluation report states further that, as a consequence of the peace agreement, three months of peace have been secured between the two communities, during which pasture and water have been shared, and the loss of livestock has been drastically reduced. It seems that members of different ethnic groups are continuing to promote peaceful relations by collaborating in the aversion of raids, even at the risk of being perceived as acting against their own community. These changes were observed not only by people who were directly involved in project implementation (be it as providers or beneficiaries of assistance), but also by outsiders to the specific setting. The success story of the Buluk experience has apparently spread quickly, and so the herdiers in Sarge reported that a group of Hamar had approached them in order to reach a similar agreement and to use the water around the Kenyan-Ethiopian border jointly. The same story was heard again in Ileret, both from the members of the peace committee and from the commanding police officer. Accord-
ing to him, this has been a development independent from the project, in which the neighbouring community has even shown willingness to contribute their own resources.

During the time of the field visit as part of this documentation assignment, the durability of the agreement between the Gabbra and the Dasanach was challenged. There had been a raid in which members of the Dasanach community from the Ethiopian side had stolen goats from the Gabbra community across the border in Kenya. How would the affected people react? According to the VSF programme manager in Ileret, retaliation would previously have been an automatic re-

sponse, but surprisingly negotiations took place out of own initiative. In fact, members of the Dasanach community in Kenya mounted pressure on their kinsmen from the Ethiopian side to recover the stolen animals and to return them to their rightful owners. This clearly shows the commitment of the population to the peace process.

Another meeting shortly afterwards can serve as further proof of the level of trust developed already. Mem-
bers of the water users association and of the peace committee from the Gabbra and the Dasanach communi-

ties met at Buluk for one of the regular follow-up meetings and even stayed there over night. For the Dasanach, this was seen as a daring decision, which could have threatened their lives under conditions of

This documentation mainly focuses on the effect that the introduction of the “Do No Harm” approach has had on the relationship between these two communities on the Kenyan side of the border. The fact that VSF can not operate di-
rectly within Ethiopian territory has probably made it more difficult to come to concrete actions across the border. Furthermore, the process involved people from the Ethiopian side at a later stage, so that similar results may be ob-
served in future.
conflict. Although not being involved in the raids two weeks before, the very identity of belonging to a certain community would have made them a legitimate target according to the local mentalities. The fact that nothing happened can be taken as an indicator that peace has come.

When applying the five criteria of effectiveness from the “Reflecting on Peace Practices” approach, amazing conclusions can be drawn:

Does the programme contribute to stopping a key driving factor of the conflict?
One of the key driving factors of the various conflicts in the area has been the competition over scarce resources. This has been addressed by the reciprocal grazing agreements. Another driving factor, the availability of small arms, has not yet been touched.

Does the programme cause communities to develop their own peace initiatives?
The action of the Dasanach community from the Kenyan side to talk to their kinsmen across the border and to convince them to return their loot can surely be seen as an independent peace initiative. Another example is the request from the Hamar for the joint use of water resources at Surge.

Does the programme result in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances?
For this purpose, the project has helped in establishing joint peace committees.

Does the programme prompt people to resist violence and provocations to violence?
Obviously, the Gabbra community has at least waited for a negotiated solution instead of immediate retaliation after the recent raid.

Does the programme result in an increase in people’s security or in their sense of security?
The surprising incident of people from the Dasanach community spending a night at Buluk together with their Gabbra counterparts in spite of the unsettled issue over the recent raids confirms the feeling of trust and security.

All these examples can serve as convincing indicators for the success of the process started by VSF Germany in Northern Kenya. Given the long history of violent conflict, the marginalization of the area, the close vicinity of a number of different ethnic groups with distinct languages and traditions, this must come as a big surprise. Not all of this can be attributed to the application of the “Do No Harm” approach, however. It is rather the combination of aspects of conflict-sensitive planning, of participatory community development approaches, and of elements of direct peace-building which has contributed to these results.

In the words of another independent evaluator, “the peace building activities in Ileret is the ideal example of connectedness. An intervention to solve a short term problem (access to water and grazing in an area between the tribes that has been avoided because of the inter-tribal hostilities) will extend to a long-term use of the formerly unused resources, but will also contribute to development between the 2 tribes. ... The project in Ileret extends to not only the immediate people involved but to both tribes (Dasanach and Gabbra). It can also serve as a model of how two tribes can settle a great deal of their problems and get into a win-win situation.”

Structures and Capacities
Apart from the fact that violent conflicts had for a number of years haunted the area where VSF Germany implemented its part of the “Improved Community Response to Drought” project, the work in this northernmost region of Kenya was additionally affected by a couple of other adverse factors. The most serious obstacle for the project staff surely was the remote location of the place and the lack of infrastructure. By car, Ileret can only be accessed through two poorly-maintained dust tracks across the Chalbi Desert, and so the costs for the transport of personnel and materials are excessively high. Quicker connections to Nairobi are kept through the flights offered by ECHO, which are serving a number of remote locations in Northern and North-Eastern Kenya, where international NGOs implement relief projects. Although being the centre for the Dasanach community, Ileret itself has no electricity supply, no running water, no telephone connections, and the next filling station is 500 kilometres away. For the project staff, this means that all materials necessary for the effective implementation of the project have to be procured in Nairobi, and that a considerable effort is spent on issues of logistics.

VSF has established a small project office at the Catholic mission in Ileret, which also has a satellite internet connection, so that communication can be upheld. Nevertheless, the living conditions are hard for the project staff, including the supply of food and the standard of accommodation (at the local school building). This is not the place to complain about lack of comfort, but this situation also has its effects on the development potential of the area. Most seriously, the Kenyan government is – apart from the police – conspicuously absent in Ileret. No social services exist, and the level of education is extremely poor. This also includes knowledge about many basic aspects of life, such as hygiene, sanitation, and public health.

It also means that veterinary extension services are hardly existing on the side of the government, leaving the Community Animal Health Workers trained by VSF without a competent structure outside of the project itself. Since it is even hard for an international NGO like VSF to recruit and to retain qualified staff for such a remote location, some project beneficiaries might be left on their own, as the example of the resignation of the livestock development officer has shown. Furthermore, the absence of structures has also left its mark on the minds of the local people, who have difficulties to engage themselves in any new community-based institution, simply because they have no idea about how such structures could function. This is also raised as a concern in the final evaluation report, where it is mentioned that, although reciprocal grazing agreements were signed, “no intercommunity committee exists to ensure peaceful use of resources and adherence to the rules set.”

For VSF’s programme manager, it must have been a hard task to introduce new approaches to this environment, particularly as a woman in a male-dominated pastoralist society with a group of experienced male colleagues. It is due to her own personal capacities, through which she brought in practical experience with and a sound knowledge of “Participatory Integrated Community Development” plus competence as a graduate of a Training of Trainers on “Do No Harm”. It can be argued, however, that a more comprehensive approach would be needed with regard to the capacity-building of the organization’s staff as a whole. This would include, for example, a thorough introduction of all staff members to the “Do No Harm” approach and a participation in the existing networks of practitioners. It should not be taken for granted that all staff members transfer the same messages of participatory development and conflict sensitivity without a coordinated strategy to that effect.

Partnerships and Cooperation
As mentioned above, the project office of VSF in Ileret is located within the Catholic mission, though with a separate entrance. Apart from the churches, there hardly seem to be anybody else working in the field of development among the Dasanach. The high reputation of the Benedictine monks running the Ileret mission,
their proven commitment for the establishment of basic social services, and the experience of some church institutions in both development activities and in peace-building, all this makes the Catholic Church a valuable partner for VSF. In light of the “Do No Harm” approach, this close partnership reaffirms the implicit ethical message of “Cooperation, Coordination, Use of Synergies”. Unfortunately, the Development Department and the Peace and Justice Department of the Catholic Diocese are located in Marsabit, 500 kilometres away, so that they can hardly have an impact in Ileret.

VSF’s staff members have also established cordial relationships with the few existing government institutions in the area. For the commanding police officer, this has had the big advantage that he has come to personally know people from the neighbouring communities, which has proved helpful in keeping law and order. The police administration is maintaining radio communication across the area, and so it is sometimes possible for VSF staff, too, to transmit messages to some of the outlying project locations. From a “Do No Harm” perspective, the cooperation with the Kenyan police has a legitimization effect for one of the actors within the context of a violent conflict between the Gabbra and the Dasanach. Accordingly, this cooperation should be based on the finding that both parties in the conflict view the police as a connector.

Otherwise, Ileret is close to the Sibiloi National Park and to the Koobi Fora Archaeological Site. Interestingly enough, the park headquarters have once been selected as the venue for previous peace negotiations between the two ethnic groups, partly because of the trespassing of herders into the protected wildlife areas and the resulting fights in the immediate vicinity of Koobi Fora. Since both the National Park (through the more or less strong interpretation of the access rules) and the archaeologists (who employ local people for exploration and excavation and who are running a mobile health service) might have an impact on the conflict, it would be wise to create awareness on “Do No Harm” and to explain the project objectives among this group of people, too.

Finally, there is a peace-building activity going on called “Pastoralist Communication Initiative”, which is primarily engaged in the conflict between the Gabbra and the Borana. While this initiative is exclusively addressing peace-building and conflict management without a clear link to any development activities, results published so far seem to have been very promising. Unfortunately, it was not possibly to verify the available information, but again it appears to be wise to seek for official contacts.

### Observations of the Communities

#### Perceptions about VSF

Very often in development work, success is not so much a question of academic knowledge or the technical quality of inputs, but rather a result of a meaningful interaction between NGO staff and the local population. This interaction determines how much is taken up as valuable innovation into a particular context, to what extent improvements can be maintained in a sustainable way, and to what degree people take ownership of the development process. For this reason, it is interesting to inquire about the perceptions that local people have about the organizations working in their environment. Unfortunately, perceptions are rarely based on actual facts, but rather on rumours and hearsay, on prejudices and subjective feelings, or on personal encounters and incidental events. Nevertheless, experience has shown that such perceptions are often the decisive factor for the degree to which an organization is accepted in a particular community. For this reason, the “Do No Harm” approach takes into consideration the implicit ethical messages that project staff transfer alongside their work, having realized that some of these messages might actually reinforce existing tensions in a situation of conflict.

Based on the responses from the local population in Dukana and in Ileret, it can safely be concluded that VSF has gained a considerable reputation after only a short presence in the area. This may partly be attributed to the specific methodologies used, particularly the “Do No Harm” approach and “Participatory Integrated Community Development”, and the type of activities implemented, which seem to be highly relevant to the pastoralist context in Northern Kenya. More so, it is probably a result of the personal interaction between VSF staff and the local population. Representatives of the government praised the organization for “really going to the communities” and for building harmonious relations with the authorities and with local leaders at the same time. All improvements in Ileret and surroundings were attributed to the work of the Catholic Peace and Justice Commission, to VSF and to its Ethiopian partner EPARDA. It seems that the government would be interested in an even stronger cooperation with VSF due to the greater capacities which the international organization can dispose of.

The general acceptance of VSF among the community was also expressed by representatives from both the Gabbra and the Dasanach. It was acknowledged that the work so far “has responded to the real needs of the people” (Dasanach woman), and that “the results have been satisfactory” (Gabbra chief). There were, however, also occasional complaints about the bias of individual staff members and about a certain neglect for the needs of the townspeople. Furthermore, one chief reported about the lack of respect for traditional ways of communication, a potentially critical issue in case that local leaders might not back the process that VSF had engaged in and act as “gate keepers” as a consequence.

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39 In this regard, VSF may need to be careful, though. Since the capacities of the government are so weak, there is a certain risk that the international NGO takes over the responsibility for certain social services and thus replaces the role of the authorities (see “Substitution Effects” on page 25). It was mentioned, for example, that there are more data collectors and animal health workers in VSF than in the government.
Linkages between Technical Inputs and Issues of Conflict

Following the fundamental realization that conflict sensitivity in programme planning and implementation is a must in situations of violent conflict, the “Do No Harm” approach had been taken up by VSF in order to ensure that the various activities in livestock development, in animal health care, in securing access to water and grazing, and in community banking would not exacerbate existing tensions between the different ethnic groups involved. As shown in the previous chapters, this had not so much been a result of a pre-defined strategy, but rather a spontaneous decision based on observations on the ground. It was surprising, however, to notice the perceptions of the community members about this process during the field visit related to this documentation assignment.

In the eyes of the people in Dukana and in Ileret, VSF Germany is mainly seen as a peace organization. There are clear expectations towards the organization to act on conflict resolution and peace-building, while the link between the technical inputs – for which VSF is generally known and on which their reputation is built – and those “soft skills” is not seen. Particularly in Dukana, where community members praised VSF for being the first organization that has addressed the issue of peace in a convincing way, there seems to be little awareness about the purpose of the project and about the real competence of VSF. But even in Ileret, where there is more interaction with the project staff due to the fact that the project office is located there, people perceived VSF first of all as a mediator, who has facilitated processes which the communities could not support themselves, and whose main merit has been to bring the communities together.

Why should an organization specialized in veterinary services do that? Only upon further questioning, somebody mentioned that “it is good to address issues of peace in order to use this information to solve problems appropriately”, and in this context, water and pastures were cited as examples for the major problems in the area. Nevertheless, while the link between peace and development on the programmatic level of the project seems to be unknown to the communities, everybody is well aware about the implications which conflict has had on the opportunities for development in the past. Local people know that conflict is an obstacle for the access to water and pastures, and they have particularly experienced this in disputed areas like Sabare, Buluk and Darate. Local people know that the awareness about the needs of their neighbours is a prerequisite for local people achieving sustainable solutions to address problems, and local people fear that the results of any development activities could face destruction if the tensions between the different ethnic groups are not accommodated.

It may be the recognition of peace being the fundamental basis for any improvements of the livelihood of the pastoralists in the area which may have distorted the perception of VSF’s objectives. It may also be the unexpected success of the meetings in Buluk, in Sabare, and in North Horr, which have influenced the way the organization is seen by the local population. While it must be a very positive feeling to receive such recognition, though, VSF may have to invest more in sharing information about the project’s justification, strategies and objectives. The expectations raised in terms of peace-building may otherwise overwhelm an organization which does not really have the experience and the skills in this field. Instead, it would be important to address the interrelation between peace and development explicitly and to demonstrate the project results as positive outcomes of this process and as manifestations for the importance of peace. It seems that news about this have spread widely, since even one of the local Gabbra chiefs who was otherwise quite critically inclined, agreed that “it is good to address issues of peace in order to use this information to solve problems appropriately”, and so on. The objective of the project is “to reduce the impact of drought on the livelihoods of vulnerable communities” and not to establish peaceful relationships between the Gabbra and the Dasanach, which would only be one of many enabling factors to reach this objective.

And in fact, the project has already had an impact in terms of its technical inputs as well, which should be viewed as examples of this interrelation between peace and development. As the final evaluation states, although the Gabbra and the Dasanach can already be seen as a success in itself. Knowing each other face to face and being able to learn about differences and stereo-

The local population has observed these changes as well, but has obviously not seen them as central activities of VSF’s intervention. During a community meeting in Ileret, people put a lot of emphasis on the joint committees between the Dasanach and the Gabbra – bringing together development and peace-building activities. Although information sharing may seem difficult in a society where hardly anyone is able to read and write and where modern media are absent, it may be wise to report more about the intentions of the project in public meetings, through the churches, and particularly through existing traditional channels that reach out to the small settlements and to the remote grazing areas. Combined with a participatory process of facilitating the development of own action plans, the emergence of new opportunities could have a stabilizing effect on the current peaceful situation. Already there are new ideas floated, such as the establishment of a common market in Darate (which might eventually also lead to de-stocking and to a reduction of environmental damage) and the introduction of dairy goats. As the Ileret councillor put it, “if other opportunities exist, people lose interest in such exhausting things like raids”.

"the practice of having dry and wet season grazing systems existed in the community. The project built on this, for example, the rangelands in Surge and Buluk were utilized as dry season preparedness plans on coordinated sharing of resources yet to take place. …

5 existing shallow wells, initially described as ‘hole with water’ were rehabilitated; diameter, depth and yield increased. The wells were capped and troughs made in Kadite and Buluk areas to ease conflicts over water between Gabbra and Dasanach."

40 Amazingly, the lack of understanding for this interrelation on the conceptual level of the project can also be observed among some of those who are directly involved in the implementation of activities. As one artisan taking part in the rehabilitation of the Buluk wells mentioned, he was not even informed beforehand that this work would have to be done in cooperation with colleagues from the other side. He further remarked that participation in workshops is mostly reserved for the “big shots”, and so the link does not become clear.

41 GITHIRI & MURSAL, pages 19-20

Photo 22

Traditional wooden trough at Ileret

Attitude and Behaviour Change

Many of the respondents during the field visit to Dukana and to Ileret confirmed the progress achieved through the two “Do No Harm” workshops in Buluk and in Sabare, and it seems that the interrelation between the absence of violent conflicts and the opportunities for development are recognized by the local people. The sharing of a formerly disputed water point and the reciprocal grazing agreements are viewed as positive outcomes of this process and as manifestations for the importance of peace. It seems that news about this have spread widely, since even one of the local Gabbra chiefs who was otherwise quite critically inclined about the communication policies of VSF declared that he was impressed that “people speak about the peace meeting in Buluk.”

The experience from the global “Reflecting on Peace Practices Project” has shown that many good initiatives have eventually not led to a sustainable improvement of relationships unless there was an explicit strategy to combine a “key people” approach and a “more people” approach and to move from the individual level to the socio-political level (see also diagram on page 10). While some promising steps have been taken, it would definitely be too early to evaluate the project activities in this regard at this point in time. It is interesting, however, to analyse some of the responses from the community meetings in Ileret and in Dukana with respect to the attitudes that people carry vis-à-vis their neighbours.

What has changed in the perceptions about the other communities among those who were part of the process? Many people believe that having a meeting between the Gabbra and the Dasanach can already be seen as a success in itself. Knowing each other face to face and being able to learn about differences and stereo-

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types (particularly through the analysis of “dividers” and “connectors”) obviously led to discussions about finding ways of working and living together. The particular atmosphere of the meetings with sharing of tools, of food and accommodation further contributed to this change of perceptions, which was later strengthened even more through the experience of working together in well construction. Community members in Ileret reported to have realized commonalities and to have questioned their stereotypes as a consequence. This change of minds due to personal interactions was said to have decreased the acceptance of raids against “people we know”. From the point of view of someone responsible for security in the area, the commanding police officer confirmed these remarks by adding that “meetings take now place at common places, where people are sleeping together, eating together, and having joint social programmes: Knowing each other prevents people from raiding each other!”

The second “Do No Harm” workshop extended the outreach of the project’s peace-building aspects across the Kenyan border. Herders in Surge particularly welcomed this move, as many problems of insecurity involved the Hamar and other ethnic groups on the Ethiopian side. Responses concerning the outcome of the Sabare workshop were quite similar to those referring to the Buluk workshop. It seems that the analysis of “dividers” and “connectors” from the “Do No Harm” approach made people aware of the many commonalities they share and that the personal encounters gave a face to the abstract notion of the “enemy” unknown so far. It was further noted that the issue of cattle theft could be more easily discussed with many, so that any pin-pointing could be avoided. Participants of the meeting in Sabare reached an agreement on the return of animals, but so far no action was taken, due probably to seasonal migrations.

Without specifically mentioning the application of the “Do No Harm” approach, the authors of the final project evaluation commented on the issue of change of attitudes and behaviours as follows:

Joint training of Dasanach and Gabbra on water management increased bonding between the two groups. In addition, the water workers tour changed attitudes, increased endurance and expanded the imagination of participants on design of water points. … Peace has increased networking and transparent interactions between communities, including intercommunity marriage proposals (for example, between Gabbra and Dasanach) that have never been seen before. This is likely to reduce raids as one cannot steal from or kill a relative. Constant communication between communities, information flow, verification and clarifications is important to sustain peace.

How reliable can such sudden changes be following long years ofanimosity? This remains a critical issue in spite of all the praise given to the project interventions. “Our young men want peace”, the herders in Surge categorically claimed, only to add that they were suspicious about others’ intentions. Similarly, there were accusations that the Dasanach chief in Ileret was somehow part of the recent raid on the Gabbra, which was explained in a long story full of mistrust about hidden agendas and double-faced declarations. Even stronger are the reservations against people from the Ethiopian side of the border, “who live a life in the jungle”, so that many people don’t seem to have much hope for sustainable peace.

**Sustainability of Peaceful Co-Existence**

The long-term success of VSF’s intervention aiming at an “Improved Community Response to Drought” will be highly dependent on the durability of the agreements reached and on the willingness of all ethnic groups to keep peace even under adverse climatic conditions. This requires a high ability of the communities themselves to maintain or take up dialogue and to replicate exercises done together, in particular after incidences of raids. From a point of view of conflict management, some deeper questions need to be raised in this regard which go beyond the formal signing of declarations and agreements. Some even argue that “actual signing of peace agreements is counter productive. It works better when agreements are verbal. Written agreements cause jitters due to the permanency of the deal in circumstances that demand opportunistic behaviors in order to survive.”

As the previous chapter has shown, there are many examples about the change of attitudes among people who have been involved in the “Do No Harm” workshops. The working groups during these events revealed a number of issues within the respective communities that were contributing towards the continuous tensions with the neighbouring ethnic groups, and which were regarded as important enough to demand urgent attention. Surprisingly enough, the reflections among workshop participants came to the conclusion that women had, although not being involved in the actual fighting, played a big role in promoting the hostilities. The traditional cultural patterns of reverence for bravery and physical strength and the habit of demanding bride wealth and the head of cattle had led to an idolization of the “warrior”, and women were seen as major inciters accordingly. While such aspects had been discovered during the “Do No Harm” workshops and while a joint reflection process had resulted from these findings, more would need to be done to effectively address the underlying issues – a task that would surely go beyond the general understanding of VSF’s current project.

On the other hand, the establishment of personal linkages has probably left a strong mark on the perceptions of each other. Since these encounters have not been limited to the actual workshop situation, but have been further developed through planning and implementation of common activities, the change of attitudes may have a chance to continue. This has been shown by own initiatives following the agreements reached in Buluk and in Sabare, best documented by the proposal to reopen a second well in another disputed area between the Gabbra and the Dasanach as a consequence of the positive experience made. In the eyes of the commanding police officer in Ileret, the spirit of cooperation has become surprisingly strong within a very short period and, even in light of challenges like the recent raid on the Gabbra, this “process can not be spoilt by one incident”. Some of the success of VSF can accordingly be attributed to the establishment of structures which are instrumental in supporting the peace process and which may need to be strengthened even further. The final evaluation report describes this as follows:

> “The disaster planning committees were highly active … They doubled up as users and people committees. Their commitment was highly visible in the facilitation of intercommunity dialogues on peace issues meant to bring on board the Hamar and Albore.”

but also:

> “Water management committees were trained but no intercommunity water committee was formed between the Gabbra and the Dasanach to ensure effective utilization of shared water points and enforcement of community agreements.”

The experience of war has made local populations along the Kenyan-Ethiopian border very suspicious of each other, and so the cooperation in inter-community planning can be seen as a meaningful step in direction of a peaceful co-existence. There is also a need for security, however, and mutual mistrust seems to be particularly high in this regard, with the implication that everybody would avoid by all means the risk of exposing oneself to attacks from outside. During the field visit to Dukana and Ileret, it was reported on several occasions that there are two many weapons on the other side of the border and that the Ethiopian government allows communities to use violence across the border. Problems between the Gabbra and the Hamar were mentioned to jeopardize the whole peace process: “So far we have not responded, but …!” was one of the comments during a meeting with community members, showing that the change of attitudes has not yet taken roots. Or, as one Gabbra chief put it, “people have forgotten security while talking about peace”.

Another issue which needs to be considered with respect to the sustainability of peace-building efforts so far is justice. There has been a tendency in conflict resolution processes everywhere in Africa to focus on the

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43 Githini & Mursal, page 29
44 Participants in the community meeting at Dukana seemed to be very hopeful about this development in a place they called Shull Bath, which literally means “lost beauty”.
45 Githini & Mursal, pages 17-18
cessation of hostilities, to forget about the past and to start afresh. Such processes have failed to address the underlying causes of violent confrontations and should be viewed with scepticism. In contrast to this, the Il-eret councillor demanded that “peace should not be separated from justice”, but rather be seen as an opportunity for talking about the issues at stake. The application of the “Do No Harm” approach has brought up some of the causes of conflict and may be further used to develop options for the implementation of activities that bring communities together. This would not solve the problem of impunity, though. Working in a pastoralist environment puts the specific challenge of a different notion of “guilt”, where a whole group is seen as responsible for the actions of each of its individual subjects. This relieves the individual person of certain responsibilities, which can be positive (“our elders are advisers – the warriors respect the elders, so that the peace messages are followed”) as well as negative (“we obey, even if it means attacking our friends”) 46. According to the commanding police officer in Illeet, some change of attitudes also seems to have taken place in this regard with community members admitting the failures of their own members and punishing the individual culprits for actions committed elsewhere.

Both quotations are taken from a meeting with community members at Ileret, during which some of the young men present were challenged with questions about their relationship to traditional community structures, specifically the council of elders.

Part 3: Conclusions
Suggestions for an Effective Integration of “Do No Harm”

General Comments

The original objective of this study was the documentation of experiences from the application of the “Do No Harm” approach in VSF’s “Improved Community Response to Drought” project. This was based on the many positive comments which project staff had received with respect to the surprising results they had achieved in their work with pastoralist communities who had been traditional enemies. This positive feedback had come from the project beneficiaries themselves, from other organizations working in the region, and from independent evaluators assessing the outcome of project implementation. Accordingly, it was regarded as worthwhile to document the process that VSF had followed, to analyse the experiences gained and the lessons learned, and to outline a model for a participatory, conflict-sensitive approach to development in pastoralist environments.

The field visit to North Horr, to Dukana and to Ilonet did indeed reveal many amazing results, for which VSF and its staff, particularly the local programme manager, deserve high praise. Studying of the various documents and interviews with staff and local community representatives also revealed, however, that the whole process was rather based on spontaneous adaptations of the programme to the local needs in a situation of violent conflict than on a systematic approach. Accordingly, the way through which “Do No Harm” was introduced to VSF’s project can not serve as a model in the true sense of the word. Nonetheless, the experience can well serve as an example for the benefits of the approach, for the opportunities resulting from its application, as well as for the challenges faced. The respective conclusions are taken up in this part of the report and are looked at in line with other experiences from the “Local Capacities for Peace Project in the Horn of Africa” and from various consultancy assignments in many countries of East Africa.47

As a result of all these experiences, some recommendations can be given which all together lay out a process that would lead to an effective integration of conflict sensitivity into both the programming of individual projects and into the organizational development of institutions working in pastoralist environments. The following chapter focuses on four particular aspects:

- Roles and Objectives
- Structures and Capacities
- Approaches
- Linkages

For each of these aspects, some guiding questions are presented that eventually lead to a number of concrete recommendations.

47 The author of this report had been the director of the “Local Capacities for Peace Project in the Horn of Africa” from its beginning in March 2001 to its closure in December 2006. This project had tried to introduce the “Do No Harms” approach to various partner organizations in Kenya, in Ethiopia and in Sudan through providing information, training of staff members, accompaniment of implementation processes, networking and sharing of experiences, and research and documentation.

Recommendations

Roles and Objectives

Working in pastoralist environments very often means working in situations with difficult environmental and climatic conditions, where people are struggling for survival upon limited natural resources. The particular pattern of livelihood of pastoralist communities requires a high degree of mobility in order to make optimal use of scarce resources, which at the same time makes an uninterrupted supply of social services from the side of the respective government institutions difficult. As a result, such communities very often feel marginalized and dependent on finding own solutions for their various social and economic problems. As environmental changes directly affect the livelihood of pastoralist communities, they are highly vulnerable to climatic events such as droughts and floods, which then lead to further competition over scarce resources. As a result, most pastoralist environments are also marked by a high degree of inter-ethnic conflict, in which the access to water and pastures becomes a continuous object of tension. Relief and development projects working in such situations have to be aware of these aspects and assure that their interventions, whether in form of social services, economic assistance or infrastructure, are implemented in a conflict-sensitive way.

This demands for the following considerations:

- Take an explicit decision to integrate conflict-sensitivity into programming.
  In most cases, project activities in pastoralist communities can not be implemented without due consideration for the context of conflict in which they are taking place. This interrelation, which is well known to the local people and which strongly affects the sustainability of any improvements, needs to be reflected in the project documents. Instead of retreating from areas of insecurity or neglecting the impact of conflict on a particular project, relief and development organizations are required to take a pro-active step and consider the conflict environment in their programming decisions. It should not be tolerated to focus on sectoral competence alone or to shelf violent conflict under “risks and assumptions”.

- Determine the steps of an accompanying process for the staff from training to practical application.
  Working in situations of violent conflict demands for additional considerations and requires specific knowledge and skills of the staff. Conflict-sensitive approaches like “Do No Harm” may be easily understood at the attendance of an introductory workshop, but experience has shown that many people are struggling with the implementation in the field. For this reason, a follow-up process should be planned right from the beginning, during which staff members receive a kind of mentoring.

- Develop conflict-sensitive indicators for measuring the success of a project.
  The process of objective-oriented project planning usually results in a logical framework matrix with specific indicators measuring the achievements of an intervention. In most cases, particularly in projects with a high degree of technical inputs, the resulting indicators are of a quantitative nature, while peace-building is per definition more a qualitative process. It is important, however, that the conflict-sensitive aspects of programming are also reflected as a measurable outcome. Depending on the particular project activities, it will be a challenging task for programme planners to adjust their indicators accordingly.

- Decide on guidelines for the organizational presence in the field.
  As the discussions leading to the development of the “Do No Harm” approach have revealed, organizations do not only influence their respective conflict environment through their activities, but also through the implicit ethical messages that they or their staff are transferring. Particular procedures or the behaviour of individual staff might inadvertently reaffirm war mentalities, and so organizations should be prepared to spend some time on reflecting how they would like to be perceived in an envi...
roment of violent conflict. This might involve the adaptation of guidelines and procedures, the adherence to a code of conduct, and a respective induction process for new staff.

- Take an informed decision on whether peace-building should become an objective in itself. While “Do No Harm” tries to make sure that projects don’t have any negative side-effects on the conflict situation, it does not address the causes for the tensions in a particular context. For this purpose, specific peace-building tools would need to be applied. Any organization working in a pastoralist environment should reflect on the respective needs in terms of time, resources and capacities and, if appropriate, take up peace-building in a genuine way. This would mean establishing “peace” as a separate project objective without neglecting the cross-cutting nature of conflict sensitivity in the core activities of the respective intervention.

### Structures and Capabilities

If conflict-sensitive planning is seen as a mandatory aspect of programme implementation in pastoralist environments, this will have consequences on the required skills of staff members both in the field and at the headquarters. It can not be taken for granted that people who are experts in water and sanitation, in livestock management or in veterinary health services are able to adapt their way of working to a situation of violent conflict just by common sense. Some investment into capacity-building of project staff is needed as well as awareness creation among local partners and beneficiaries. Since conflict sensitivity must be a cross-cutting issue, this would necessarily involve training on all levels of an organization and not restrict it to one particular person covering the “peace” component of a project. At the same time, there needs to be a circular process of continuous learning based on the lessons from field experience.

The following steps are recommended in this regard:

- **Conduct an exposure workshop** on “Do No Harm” for all staff involved in a project. The process of integrating conflict sensitivity into programme implementation surely starts with a formal workshop, during which the theoretical concept is presented and its relevance for a particular project environment is discussed. Based on this initial learning, further reflections will be stimulated, which will eventually enable project staff to appropriately consider the context of conflict in their programming decisions. It needs to be clarified, however, that a workshop can only mark the beginning of a process and should not be regarded as an end in itself. In line with experience made with other organizations, this capacity-building should also involve the responsible persons in human resource management, finance administration, logistics and programme management, so that the various departments of an organization understand each other’s “language”.

- **Select a focal person** for conflict sensitivity within your organization. In order not to be too dependent on outside consultants, it is advisable to entrust one staff member with the follow-up of the process. Such person may not only serve as a constant reminder for the need to be conflict-sensitive, but may also act as an internal resource person after further capacity-building, e.g. in a Training of Trainers. In addition, this could give an organization access to a whole network of practitioners working in similar contexts on similar challenges. It is important, though, to select a suitable person for this task from within the existing programme staff and not to create a specific position which would undermine the cross-cutting nature of the issue.

- **Conduct an introductory workshop** on “Do No Harm” for selected beneficiaries. The experience of VSF in Northern Kenya has clearly shown that the communities involved in a context of conflict react very positively to the “Do No Harm” approach, particularly to the parts that analyse the local context. The attitude change observed among the Gabbra and the Dasanach is a result of sharing the knowledge of conflict-sensitive planning with local people on the ground, who would then even be able to develop own suggestions for project activities linking people to each other. A “Do No Harm” workshop on community level may be quite different from an exposure workshop for project staff, with more emphasis on the context, on dividers and connectors – which local people know much better anyway – than on the more complicated assessment of the consequences of certain programming decisions. Furthermore, it is recommended to involve local authorities, religious leaders and other decision makers at this stage.

- **Invest in additional capacity-building on participatory approaches**. Since “Do No Harm” can not stand on its own, there may be an additional need for capacity-building on the moderation of participatory planning approaches. In the end, the successful integration of conflict sensitivity depends on the ability of the staff to combine the respective questions with the process of developing community action plans. Even though there may still be a great need to explain the true meaning of “ownership” and “participation”, experience has shown that the sustainability of interventions is highly dependent on the degree to which local people see a project as theirs. This is particularly true for pastoralist communities, who are used to take decisions on their own. As there is no blue-print for integrating “Do No Harm” into participatory planning, programme staff are required to have a good understanding of both.

- **Invest in additional capacity-building on peace-building and conflict management**. The importance which violent conflicts have on the life of many pastoralist communities may force organizations to do more than “no harm” and spend much more time on addressing the tensions in the environment in which they are working. This may even mean that organizations would need to go beyond their original mandate and engage in direct peace-building and conflict resolution activities. The sensitive nature of such issues requires a high degree of mediation skills and a reliable knowledge of particular approaches. In case that an organization decides to extend working in conflict by working on conflict and to implement respective activities itself, staff members would need to be introduced to additional tools and concepts. This should by no means be underestimated!

- **Support the emergence of inter-community structures** and involve them in programming decisions. The “Do No Harm” approach allows local people to look at their own conflict situation and to analyse the relationships between the various groups in a particular environment, while participatory planning invites them to develop their own action plans and to address some of their basic problems themselves. In the case of the workshops conducted in Buluk and in Sabare, the discussions around “Do No Harm” have resulted in the emergence of inter-community structures that proved to be instrumental for the joint planning of activities. In order to sustain this process, it would be important to support such structures and to promote their role in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating of projects. At this stage, there would also be an opportunity to introduce those modules of the “Do No Harm” approach that might not have been covered in the above mentioned introductory workshops, since they would have a much more practical value when it comes to real planning.

- **Coordinate the systematic documentation** of lessons learned with the application of “Do No Harm”. The integration of the “Do No Harm” approach requires a lot of flexibility and creativity. Since every context is different, there can be no schematic solutions, and so programme staff have to develop their own options depending on the particular environment they find themselves in. It would be helpful for the global community of “Do No Harm” practitioners to share those experiences and to learn from each other. Accordingly, it would be advisable to collect relevant information systematically and to make the lessons learned available to the general public. This report itself is considered a step in that direction.
Approaches

People working in situations of violent conflict are usually very enthusiastic about “Do No Harm”. After an initial workshop, facilitators often receive comments about the high relevance of the approach for a particular context and about the advantages that a systematic way of looking at the interaction between relief and development on one hand and the context of violent conflict on the other hand offers. The step from training to application, however, is not an automatic one. Programme staff often find it difficult to implement the “Do No Harm” approach in practice, overwhelmed by so many practical challenges in the field and squeezed between many other demands concerning implementation, in particular, data collection, logistics, report writing, financial accountability. Unless there is an explicit requirement for monitoring conflict sensitivity, it is easily forgotten. For this reason, a process of “accompaniment” is recommended that would help field staff to reflect on their decisions and to get a regular feedback.

The following suggestions should be kept in mind:

- Apply “Do No Harm” systematically in the analysis of the context together with the communities. The first three steps of the “Do No Harm” approach (context of conflict, dividers and connectors) offer a good understanding of the dynamics of a particular conflict situation, not only in terms of actors, but also regarding attitudes, values and experiences. It has been shown that the systematic use of this part of the approach enables programme staff to get a detailed picture of the area in which a project is supposed to be implemented and about the people living there. As this documentation has shown, local people love this analysis, and both Gabbra and Dasanach reported how it had opened their eyes about many issues. Whether as part of a formal workshop on “Do No Harm”, as a separate activity or at the beginning of a planning workshop, it is highly recommendable to do this analysis together with the communities, who know best about the various categories of dividers and connectors.

- Integrate conflict-sensitive questions into participatory planning procedures. The subsequent steps of the “Do No Harm” approach are a bit more difficult to understand and are not seen as so valuable for workshops at community level. The effects that programming decisions have on local markets, on the relationships between direct beneficiaries and others, on the self-help capacities of the local population, or on the reputation of individual persons, this all remains abstract unless related to very concrete activities. Accordingly, the respective explanations should rather be given when it comes to planning, and the resulting questions should be raised when local people start developing their own action plans as part of a participatory process. This requires, of course, that the facilitator of the planning workshop has sufficient knowledge about “Do No Harm”.

- Support inter-community activities that are promoting the strengthening of connectors. As a result of the analysis of the context of conflict, some of the activities suggested might be linked to a particular set of connectors. Based on the fact that the livelihood of different pastoralist communities is quite similar, it is usually easy to find a number of connectors that such communities share in spite of the tensions that exist. Here, it becomes a question of creativity to shape activities in such a way that they are intentionally strengthening these connectors, for example by promoting joint implementation, by addressing issues of common concern, by bringing people together, or by establishing market linkages.

- Use “Do No Harm” as a continuous monitoring tool for understanding the impact of the project. In order to internalize the “Do No Harm” thinking, project staff should be encouraged to document their observations and to note down their reflections about the potential impact of their decisions on the local conflict settings. Eventually, all programming decisions about the location of venues, the composition of beneficiaries, the selection of partners etc. should automatically raise certain questions about their effects on the conflict setting, so that various options could be valued against each other.

- Incorporate “Do No Harm” into organizational procedures for planning, monitoring and evaluation. Once that conflict-sensitive perceptions have become common practice during all stages of programme implementation, the experience gained in the field would need to be reported to other departments of the organization as part of a conscious effort to influence organizational procedures. While many donor governments do already demand that project interventions undertake a conflict impact assessment, there are still few concrete models of how to make this part and parcel of proposal development and of practical implementation. It is recommended to engage on such a “mainstreaming” process at the level of an organization from the perspective of lessons learned in the field in order to secure a greater “buy-in”.

Linkages

Even in a remote area like Ileret, relief or development organizations are not working in isolation. Usually, there are a number of others with whom cooperation or coordination in one form or the other may be helpful. Experience has shown, however, that the application of different approaches can send contradicting signals to the local population. This is particularly true for the conflict-sensitive perspective of “Do No Harm”, which is often questioning certain routine ways of doing things, and also for true participatory approaches, which demand a change in the roles of international organizations. In other case studies in Kenya and in South Sudan, field staff have expressed their frustration about the impossibility to achieve meaningful changes as long as other organizations continue the same way as before. Accordingly, there is also a need to look beyond the work of the own organization and to influence the general discussion about development work.

The following activities are recommended:

- Organize a regular exchange of experience for “Do No Harm” practitioners. One important aspect of cooperation is the networking among those that are in the same process of gaining experience with conflict-sensitive approaches. Listening to success stories from colleagues in other projects, collecting best practices, but also assessing short-comings and challenges in a collaborative way can help field workers gain confidence and become more creative in finding options for difficult situations. For this purpose, it is advisable to have staff members participate in a coordinated process of exchange of experience, which could be on the level of sister organizations (like the VSF family), with a geographical focus (such as the former Kenya Forum of the “Local Capacities for Peace Project in the Horn of Africa”) or as part of the networking within a particular sector (e.g. a network of organizations working with pastoralist communities).

- Liaise with other actors who are directly involved in peace-building and conflict resolution. Due to the high level of tensions in most pastoralist environments, peace organizations are usually engaged in such areas, too. Despite the obvious linkage between peace and development, relations between so-called “development organizations” and so-called “peace organizations” have unfortunately not been very strong in the past – too different were the approaches, the concepts, the backgrounds. This has started to change with the emergence of conflict-sensitive approaches and with the strong increase of available funds for peace-building activities. From the experience of VSF in Northern Kenya, it can safely be concluded that it was exactly this combination of peace-building aspects and practical development work which has led to the obvious success of the programme. Given the limited experience of most development organizations with conflict management, a stronger cooperation with institutions specialized in that field is seen as necessary.

- Lobby for the application of conflict-sensitive approaches among other organizations. Last not least, positive experience should not be hidden. Having realized the many dangers that result from positive programme implementation in situations of violent conflict, numerous organizations have taken a sense of responsibility and have once raised the questions that eventually led to the development of the “Do No Harm” approach. VSF seems now to be in the position to become part of that movement and lobby for due consideration of conflict sensitivity among other organizations in the North and in the South. For the sake of improved development practices!
Planning of a “Do No Harm” Process

Introducing Conflict Sensitivity into an Organization

*Do No Harm — How Aid Can Support Peace - or War*

When international assistance is given in the context of a violent conflict, it becomes a part of that context and thus also of the conflict. When given in conflict settings, aid can reinforce, exacerbate, and prolong the conflict; it can also help to reduce tensions and strengthen people’s capacities to disengage from fighting and find peaceful options for solving problems.

How can humanitarian or development assistance be given in conflict situations in ways that, rather than feeding into and exacerbating the conflict, help local people to disengage and establish alternative systems for dealing with the problems that underlie the conflict?

Aid agencies have a new and profound opportunity to shape their relief and development work so it accomplishes its intended goals of alleviating human suffering and supporting the pursuit of sustainable economic and social systems and at the same time promotes durable and just peace.

As experience has shown, the successful integration of conflict-sensitive programming has to be understood as a process. The provision of information in an introductory workshop is a recommendable step in this process, but can never be an end in itself. Instead, there is a sequence of activities necessary in order to achieve the internalization of conflict-sensitive questions. These steps are:

- Introductory presentation of “Do No Harm” at the management level
- Exposure workshop on “Do No Harm” for programme staff and partner representatives
- Training of Trainers for selected resource persons
- Follow-up workshop for participants of earlier workshops
- Practical training of programme staff in application of “Do No Harm”
- Conflict analysis together with communities affected by a programme
- Regular recording of observations on the interaction of programme decisions with the conflict environment
- Documentation of experiences with conflict-sensitive programming
- Inclusion of “Do No Harm” into the planning procedures of a programme
- Development of indicators for the monitoring of achievements through a “Do No Harm” lens
- Evaluation of programmes from a conflict-sensitive perspective
- Participation in networks and fora on practical application of “Do No Harm”
- Mainstreaming of “Do No Harm” into organizational policies and guidelines

Outlines of Specific “Do No Harm” Activities

Outline of an Introductory Presentation

The “Do No Harm” Framework is offering a tool to systematically analyse the impact of relief or development interventions on the conflict situation in their area of operation. During a two-hours presentation, participants will be equipped with the basic knowledge about the framework and with an understanding of how aid or development interventions may negatively affect conflict settings. 
The following components will be presented:

- Definition of the Context of Conflict
- Analysis of the various categories of “Dividers” in a conflict setting
- Analysis of the various categories of “Connectors” in a conflict setting
- Disaggregation of the components of an assistance programme
- Understanding of the direct impact of an assistance programme on a conflict setting through “Effects of Resource Transfers”
- Understanding about the danger of an unintended affirmation of war mentalities through “Implicit Ethical Messages”
- Possibilities for developing “Options” in order to prevent negative side-effects on a conflict setting
- The “Framework for Considering the Impact of Aid on Conflict” as a summary of the above mentioned modules

Outline of an Exposure Workshop (3 or 4 days)

The “Do No Harm” Framework is offering a tool to systematically analyse the impact of relief or development interventions on the conflict situation in their area of operation. During a three-days exposure workshop, participants will be equipped with the basic knowledge on the framework, with an understanding of how aid or development interventions may negatively affect conflict settings, and with some ideas of how to use this experience in future project planning.

Day 1 of an exposure workshop will start with an explanation of the background of the approach and the developments which have led to the “Do No Harm” Framework. Based on the example of a case study in a distant setting, participants will get introduced to a different view towards project results in a conflict environment. An analysis of the context of conflict, and a systematic analysis of sources of tensions (“Dividers”) as well as of local capacities for peace (“Connectors”) will be the necessary steps for the application of this first part of the framework.

Day 2 of an exposure workshop will look carefully at the details of an aid programme and how details of planning can affect the conflict setting through either resource transfers or through implicit ethical messages. Understanding such inadvertent side-effects of project decisions in conflict situations should help to look for alternative solutions, for options to redesign a programme. A wrap-up of the complete “Do No Harm” Framework will finalize the day, after which the participants should be able to understand how their decisions might affect the tensions in their environment.

Day 3 (and sometimes day 4) of an exposure workshop will try to assist the participants in the application of the framework to their own situation. Depending on the composition of the group, this day will either look into the incorporation of the “Do No Harm” Framework into existing planning procedures or analyse concrete conflict settings from the work experience of the participants and how typical project interventions might affect these settings. In case the workshop is addressing staff of a specific programme, this third day may alternatively analyse their own project planning. At the end of the workshop, the relevance of the “Do No Harm” Framework for the work of the respective organizations should be assessed, and ideas for future co-operation should be suggested.

Outline of a Training of Trainers (10 or 11 days)

The “Do No Harm” Framework is offering a tool to systematically analyse the impact of relief or development interventions on the conflict situation in their area of operation. A Training of Trainers (ToT) on this approach lasts 10 or 11 days, providing participants with the necessary basic knowledge on the approach, offering opportunities to improve on facilitation skills and to reflect on the integration of the concept into other planning approaches, and finally leading to the challenge of conducting a first workshop on their own.

Day 1 and 2 of a Training of Trainers contain a typical “Do No Harm” exposure workshop, during which the basic knowledge about the approach is presented, while at the same time the methodology of workshop facilitation (as demonstrated by three experienced trainers) is to be analysed and assessed.
Day 2

Session 5 - Interaction between Aid and Conflict: Effects of Resource Transfers
Based on the presentation of the “Do No Harm” framework at the end of Day 1, this session introduces the mechanisms through which development programmes might impact on conflict settings, focussing on the various effects linked to the transfer of resources.

Session 6 - Interaction between Aid and Conflict: Implicit Ethical Messages
Here, the second mechanism of interaction between an organization and the conflict environment is presented, highlighting the implicit messages and the respective perceptions with regard to policies, attitudes and behaviours, which could inadvertently reconfirm existing “war mentalities”.

Session 7 - Options for Programming
The imagination of the participants is challenged by acting as “consultancy groups”, advising the management of the project presented in the case study on potential improvements that would avoid negative side-effects on the respective conflict situation.

Session 8 - Presentation of Group Work Results
Following the presentation of the group recommendations and a plenary discussion about the usefulness of these recommendations for the specific case, a quick evaluation should give feedback on the two-days-introductory workshop and on the relevance of the concept.

Day 3

Session 9 - Feedback and Perspectives for Application
The first session of the third day starts with a closer look at the contents of the concept presented during the first part of the event, trying to iron out possible misunderstandings, looking at the limitations of “Do No Harm” and at potentially helpful additional tools. This leads into a discussion about potentials for application in the case of the particular country.

Session 10 - Conflict Mapping
In order to prepare for the transformation of the theoretical concept of “Do No Harm” to the local context of the particular country, this session looks at existing conflict lines and tries to analyse general relationships between different groups.

Session 11 - Conflict Analysis
Based on the results of the conflict mapping done earlier, the “Do No Harm” concept is to be applied in group work, analysing “Dividers” and “Connectors” for those inter-group conflicts that are seen as most relevant for the programmes which participants are involved in.

Session 12 - Unpacking the Programme
Here, the participants are invited to give a closer look at their own programmes, trying to extract all those programming decisions that are taken at various levels and that may have implications on the conflict setting in the particular country.

Day 4

Session 13 - Discovering Negative Impacts through Effects of Resource Transfers
The last day of the training tries to help participants shape their perspectives in order to discover potential negative impacts that some of their decisions may have. In the first session, this emphasizes the effects of resource transfers, looking particularly at the programmes where the participants work and the observations that have been made already during practical implementation.

Session 14 - Options to Address Negative Impacts
In case that negative side-effects have been observed, there may be options within the programming process that could avoid any harmful consequences. Participants should again act as “consultancy groups” and give recommendations to each other.

Session 15 - Discovering Implicit Ethical Messages
Similarly, this session should look at observations about negative (or positive) “implicit ethical messages” that the programmes and their staff may be transferring to the local population - a highly sensitive issue, but important to influence attitude change wherever necessary.

Session 16 - Way Forward
Finally, there should be a decision about the relevance of “Do No Harm” for specific programmes, and in case that there is genuine interest, the way forward for an integration of conflict sensitivity should be outlined.
Documenting Observations from Practice

**Observation Sheet “Effects of Resource Transfers”**

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<td>Place</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Name of Organization and / or Project**

To which organization is your observation related?

**Analysis of the Observation**

Which of the 5 effects of resource transfers reflects your observation?

Remember that all these effects can be either positive or negative!

**Description of the Observation**

What have you observed? Try to be precise and clear, so that the reader can easily understand!

**Explanation of the Impact of the Observation**

Does your observation have a specific impact on one of the conflicts in your area?

Try to be specific by mentioning the context of the conflict (who is in conflict with whom?)

**Alternatives for Programming**

Could you think of a different way for the organization to achieve their objective?

In many cases, we might not know an immediate answer, so don’t worry if you can’t fill this space!

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**Observation Sheet “Implicit Ethical Messages”**

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<td>Place</td>
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</table>

**Name of Organization and / or Project**

To which organization is your observation related?

**Analysis of the Observation**

Which of the 7 implicit ethical messages does your observation refer to?

Remember that all these effects can be either positive or negative!

**Description of the Observation**

What have you observed? Try to be precise and clear, so that the reader can easily understand!

**Explanation of the Impact of the Observation**

Does your observation have a specific impact on the mentalities of local people in a conflict?

Try to be specific by mentioning what the potential perception of the people could be!

**Alternatives for Programming**

Could you think of a different way for the organization and the staff to behave?

In many cases, we might not know an immediate answer, so don’t worry if you can’t fill this space!
## Annex 1: List of Participants

### Participants in Formal Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization/Role</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charles Ngichu</td>
<td>Officer Commanding Police Station</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
<td>13.07.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Mwangi</td>
<td>Officer Commanding Police Station</td>
<td>Dukana</td>
<td>11.07.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Orguba</td>
<td>Museum Director</td>
<td>Koobi Fora</td>
<td>15.07.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florian von Bayern</td>
<td>Missionary</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
<td>11.07.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andreas Jenet</td>
<td>Head of Programmes</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>16.07.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eunice Obala</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>07.07.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willy Dühnen</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>17.07.2009</td>
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### Participants in Community Meetings

<table>
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<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdulahi Hacho</td>
<td>Chairperson Water User Association</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
<td>10.07.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfonso Woto</td>
<td>Youth Representative</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ali Adan</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barile Golicha</td>
<td>Member Peace Committee</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Barile Lacha</td>
<td>Secretary Water User Association</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delge Yattani</td>
<td>Member Water User Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gomba Adano</td>
<td>Member Water User Association</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gufu Orge</td>
<td>Chief for Balesaro</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gurachaa Abudho</td>
<td>Member Water User Association</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guoyo Teti</td>
<td>Member Water User Association</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
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<td>Ibrahim Galalo</td>
<td>Member Water User Association</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>James Omuro</td>
<td>Staff Catholic Peace and Justice Commission</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jarso Jilo</td>
<td>Member Water User Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sora Gallado</td>
<td>Member Water User Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tura Gobo</td>
<td>Member Water User Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Woto Ali</td>
<td>Community Member</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
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### Encounters at Site Visits

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<td>Anonyymous</td>
<td>Ileret</td>
<td>14.07.2009</td>
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Annex 2: Selected Reference Material

Internal Project Documents
(in chronological order)

VSF BELGIUM, VSF SUISSE & VSF GERMANY: Improved Community Response to Droughts (ICRD)
Project Proposal to ECHO, November 2007

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Critique of Past Emergency Interventions in Somali, Oromiya and Karamoja Clusters
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Summary of the “Local Capacities for Peace Framework”
Brochure produced for the Partners of the LCPP Office in Nairobi Nairobi 2004
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Project Consultancy on Community Planning and Conflict Sensitive Programming

Background

VSF Germany is an international NGO supporting humanitarian and development interventions in the Horn of Africa Region mainly in Southern Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania. The main activities focus on animal health, alternative livelihood promotion, natural resource management, early warning, initiating peace and conflict resolution approaches amongst conflict communities. VSF Germany seeks to recruit a consultant to carry out a consultancy on community planning and conflict sensitive programming approach that has been used in Ileret. Internalize and document the methodology and lessons learnt on peace management in Ileret was explicitly recommended by the ECHO evaluation team. VSF Germany has combined their 12 year experience in the dry lands of Northern Kenya and the border regions of neighboring countries to implement the Improved Community Response to Drought (ICRD) project.

ICRD is a cross-border drought preparedness project funded under ECHO’s Regional Drought Decision. Its overall objective is to contribute to the improved livelihood security of pastoralists in Karamoja, Oromiya and Somali ecosystems of Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia through the development and dissemination of a model to empower communities to proactively address their own needs. VSF Germany covers Eastern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia.

Rather than providing significant levels of external support, the project seeks to enable pastoralists to build on their own knowledge and to utilize their existing assets (both social and capital) more effectively. ICRD is a pilot project, which seeks to provide a model for future drought preparedness programming. If successful, this model will be replicated.

Objective of the consultancy

Internalize and document the methodology and lessons learnt on peace management in Ileret was explicitly recommended by the ECHO evaluation team. VSF Germany has therefore seen the need to institutionalize the community planning and conflict sensitive programming approach used in Ileret. The objective of the consultancy will be to conduct an assessment and review the methodology used in Ileret and then develop a handbook on methodology and review case studies on community sensitive planning and programming. This will create a framework for VSF Germany – ICRD project second phase in 2009/10 which is appropriate to the project area.

Location

The consultancy will cover each of the three project locations:

- Ileret community (El-Hadi / Dukana, Buluk, Darate)

Timeframe

- The whole consultancy is expected to take 30 days: 3 days preparation & debriefing in Nairobi, 7 days in the field locations, 3 days meeting with the project manager, 1 day with the HoP and HoM in Nairobi, 14 days report writing and 2 days articles writing and reporting in Nairobi.

Tasks

- Prepare a detailed work plan for the consultancy which outlines the methodology to be used.
- Review existing related literature.
- Gather all relevant information from communities, local authorities and other humanitarian / development actors.
- Prepare a detailed draft report and debrief VSF in Nairobi on the main findings.

Outputs

- Integrate any feedback into the final report.
- Two (2) VSF Germany case studies of the Do No Harm approach and if lucky, a comparison to a suitable case study from another country.
- Tools description and annexes of forms (as similar attachment PRA Jenet)

Responsibilities

The VSF:

- Have an overall responsibility for logistics (transport from Nairobi to Ileret) and accommodation (in Ileret) during the mission and consultancy fees.
- Ensure the overall coordination during the mission.