Case Study

Voices of Local Peace Initiatives – Kenya Peace and Development Network, Wajir Peace and Development Committee, National Council of Churches of Kenya, and Amani People’s Theatre

This case study is one of 26 cases developed as part of the Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP). The RPP cases were not written as evaluations; rather, they were written to allow for the identification of cross-cutting issues and themes across the range of cases. Each case represents the views and perspectives of a variety of people—the case writer, agencies, project participants, and observers—at the point it was written. RPP would like to acknowledge the generosity of the agencies involved in donating their time and experience for these case studies, as well as their willingness to share their experience with the worldwide community of peace practitioners.

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Introduction

This case study looks at four different Kenyan peace groups: Amani Peoples Theatre (APT), the Peace and Rehabilitation Project of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), Kenya Peace and Development Network (PeaceNet), and Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC). These groups were chosen because they represent large and small organizations, national and community based organizations, with a variety of types of work. In addition, the case study writers were familiar with each of these groups, and had good contacts within each of them.

The case study looks at the four groups individually, but perhaps more importantly, examines the web of the “peace world” in Kenya. These four organizations are representative of this wider web of connections. The history of peace work in Kenya, beginning in 1991, is examined, with an analysis of the current state of Kenyan peace work and of the changes that have occurred.

A special emphasis in this case study was the relationship with international funders. One section looks at the issues raised by the peace groups in regards to funding issues, both present and future.

The Past

Before 1991, few organizations in Kenya dealt specifically with peace and conflict issues. The Kenya Catholic Secretariat (KCS) had a Justice and Peace Commission and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) had a similar office, but neither were at that time very active in specific conflict situations within Kenya. People for Peace in Africa, a Catholic group, was active mostly with refugee issues and with conflict issues in surrounding countries. The Nairobi Peace Initiative, after a number of years of planning, hired its first employees in mid-1990. While a few international NGOs may have had “peace” or “conflict resolution” as part of their mandates, none were active or vocal about this.

Then, in late November 1991, soon after the Kenyan constitution was amended to permit opposition political parties, serious violence broke out in western Kenya, spreading throughout 1992-1993 to encompass many parts of the country, particularly in the Rift Valley, western Kenya, Northeastern Province, and the Coast Province. Variously known as “land clashes,” “tribal clashes,” or “ethnic clashes,” many people thought they were politically inspired. Regardless of the name or their causes, these conflicts brought the greatest amount of violence to Kenya since independence.

At least 2,000 people were killed, 1,000 in Rift and Western Provinces and 1,000 in Northeastern Province, and at the height of the conflict, at least 300,000 people were internally displaced. Farms, villages, and homesteads were destroyed; crops burned; livestock killed; schools, churches, shops, and other infrastructure destroyed; and transportation disrupted in many parts of the country. Though dwarfed by the larger violent conflicts occurring in surrounding countries, the violence and resulting social problems were devastating to Kenyans.
The religious and NGO communities found themselves scrambling to respond to the violence and the resulting needs for relief, rehabilitation, and reconciliation. Many churches found themselves suddenly housing hundreds or thousands of displaced families, with few if any resources to provide for them. NGOs scrambled to enlarge their focus on development to include relief and rehabilitation. All of this occurred in a highly charged political atmosphere, in which Kenyans were struggling to make sense of what was happening to themselves, their communities, and their country.

Throughout 1992 and 1993, local, national and international organizations struggled to keep up with the situation, both in the areas that had already experienced violence and social disruption, and in those areas in which violence appeared to be imminent. Attempts were made, both at the national level and within communities, to coordinate relief and rehabilitation efforts, though these efforts were often halting and slow. Then in 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) began a program to work on the relief and rehabilitation needs in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya. Initially welcomed by NGOs and religious organizations, it soon became clear that the relationship between the UNDP and local/national organizations was problematic, to say the least.

Tecla Wanjala, a veteran Kenyan peace worker, narrates her experience working in western Kenya in the early 1990s:

“In 1993, I was working for the Catholic Diocese of Bungoma as the coordinator for relief and rehabilitation in the clash areas on and around Mt. Elgon. This followed the ethnic clashes of 1991-1992. The Catholic Diocese was working with other local, national, and a few international groups on the relief and rehabilitation necessary there. We had formed a Western Province Coordinating Committee, and were working well together. The local/national groups that were cooperating included the Kenya Catholic Secretariat, the National Council of Churches of Kenya, several Protestant churches, and some small community-based organizations. The International NGOs were Action Aid and Oxfam (UK/Ireland). Action Aid had been working in the area in development prior to the violence. Oxfam came in at the invitation of the local groups. It was Oxfam that funded my position. We didn’t have a lot of funding, but we were working together slowly by slowly. We met frequently as a coordinating committee, and were able to coordinate our work. We were working with many groups on Mt. Elgon and surrounding areas, where the violence had happened, and had made a lot of progress with the groups. We were moving toward rehabilitation of certain areas that were then safe, with income generation projects for women, and with a number of programs for the youth, which we saw as vital to preventing further violence. As a coordinating group, we were able to divide tasks among the various member organizations.

“Then in 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) came in with lots of money – 30 million Kenyan shillings (about US$750,000). With them came many other international organizations competing for that money.
UNDP promised to work with the local organizations, but all the money went to the international NGOs, many of which didn’t have the capacity to deliver what they had promised. The major local players were sidelined and the local people lost control. The process was completely hijacked. UNDP had their own agenda, which was frequently at odds with that of the local groups. We felt powerless to oppose them.

“For a time, the Coordinating Committee continued, but because of the shift in money and power, it didn’t function well. We who represented the local groups became defensive and started pushing for the rehabilitation needs that we felt were important, but we were not listened to at all. It felt very disempowering and racist. UNDP personnel were very arrogant. They were not accountable to local groups, or transparent about their own operations.

“UNDP came in with lots of money, but without a plan, relationships, or an understanding of the local situation. They promised the victims “manna from heaven” – housing, school fees, farm inputs, etc., but didn’t deliver anything. In the end, they disempowered the victims as well as the local groups. We’d been working with the victims for many months, and they had come a long way in dealing with the opposing groups and with their own healing and rehabilitation. These promises of large-scale rehabilitation that didn’t come through derailed much of our work. People became passive: they wouldn’t even build their own grass-thatched houses because they were waiting for the promised UNDP houses. Many of the victims, six years later, are still “waiting for the manna.” People are still dealing with the aftermath of this.

“Then, after less than a year, UNDP abruptly pulled out, leaving behind the victims, the strained relationships that now existed among the local groups, a legacy of misappropriated funds, and in general, a sense of bitterness and anger in many of the local workers and groups.”

Other peace workers echo Tecla’s sentiments about the UNDP chapter in Kenya peace work history. According to workers with the National Council of Churches of Kenya, which was just beginning its on-the-ground peace and reconciliation work at that time:

“UNDP came in with a good proposal of coordinating and funding grassroots organizations, but this never materialized. They took over, and ran over communities. They were operating on a very restrictive time frame, and seemed to think that if they threw enough money into relief, that healing would come. They sidelined local organizations that were already doing something. They were so tied to the government that they could not move without approval from the government, which never came.”

And from people who were working with PeaceNet (then known as the Ethnic Clashes Network) in Nairobi on a national level at that time:
“The UNDP program almost finished PeaceNet. We’d been struggling to organize a network under difficult conditions, and UNDP came in, with promises they never delivered. However, these promises – of money, infrastructure support, and other things, served to derail the processes that had been set up locally and nationally. PeaceNet had worked in a number of “flash-point” areas setting up local committees of religious groups and NGOs to monitor the situations and provide relief/rehabilitation. UNDP moved into the same areas and ignored these committees, setting up their own, often with very little input from – or knowledge about – the communities. It was UNDP policy not to hire Kenyans for essential positions, with the premise that Kenyans could not be “unbiased” in the situation the country was in. Many of the expatriates who were hired seemed unprepared for the work.”

At that time, NGOs and some religious groups were being blocked from entering the areas where the violence was occurring. UNDP continued to promise, for several months, identity cards for NGOs and religious groups which would grant “safe passage” for these groups to travel to the areas of the violence. This never happened. UNDP spoke often of the “three-legged stool” on which the rehabilitation and peacemaking relied – the UN/international community, the Kenyan government, and the NGO/religious community. In practice, that third leg was not valued.

Many peace workers in Kenya would agree that this UNDP experience was probably the low-point of peace work in Kenya, particularly concerning the relationships between international organizations and national/local organizations. Although many people were concerned about conflict and peacemaking, efforts were disorganized, weak, and unable to push forward local agendas for peace.

Following the withdrawal of UNDP, local, national, and international NGOs and religious bodies continued to work on peace and conflict issues in Kenya. With funding more widely available, and increased interest in conflict resolution work internationally, many groups either expanded their work into this area, or began with a major focus on peace and conflict resolution. Some lasted only a few months or years, some returned to their previous foci of work, and others have continued and expanded work in the general area of peacebuilding and conflict transformation.

**The Present**

The “peace world” in Kenya has changed significantly in the last ten years. In contrast to the few groups working specifically on peace and conflict issues in 1990, an interwoven group of organizations exists today, working in a loose-knit web of relationships.

A partial list of the local NGOs, religious groups, and international groups involved in Kenyan peace and conflict issues would include:

- Action Aid
More impressive than the mere number of groups, however, is the maturity of the groups, at least the “core” groups that have been working at peace issues since the early 1990s. Part of the increase in the number of groups can be attributed to the popularity of conflict resolution funding in the last decade. However, as one of the people interviewed for this case study reported, “groups will come and go depending on the funding; we really don’t pay much attention to them any more since the committed groups will be around for a long time.”

Also notable is the commitment, self-confidence, vision, and sophistication of the “core group” of Kenyan peacebuilding organizations, including the four groups included in this case study, among others. It is apparent that each of these organizations has deep, long-term commitments to justice, peace, and stability in Kenya. The commitments are lived out by work that is innovative, courageous, and responsive to the needs of various communities and cultures. These will be described in more detail in following sections.

Several changes between 1991 and the present are evident among all the groups:

1. The analysis of the causes and effects of various conflicts within Kenya has become deeper and more complex. In the early days, analysis tended to be fairly narrow: perpetrators/victims, government/opposition politics, etc., without a lot of discussion about historical processes and community realities. That has changed, so that much of the discussion does not focus on right/wrong, perpetrators/victims, but on the cultural, economic, religious, and political realities in which individuals and communities find themselves today.
2. The northern and coastal areas of Kenya (pastoralist and/or Muslim areas) have come to be seen as important parts of the country. This was not the case ten years ago, when the violent conflict in Wajir was in large part ignored by the rest of the country, including the major peace groups.

3. The groups in general are quite sure of their roles and the future of their work. As one person said, “fads among donors come and go. Right now, it is civic education. If civic education funds can be used to work on our peacebuilding vision, then we will take them. However, we won’t change our work in order to get money.” Another stated, “we work with the human rights groups, and we know that their work is important. But public advocacy is not our work; we’re working on long-term, quiet peacebuilding.”

4. The groups are self-confident that Kenyans are now in charge of the peacebuilding agenda for Kenya. When asked if “another UNDP” could happen now, the answer was a powerful, “No! We’re strong enough to prevent the peace processes from being hijacked now.” And, “If we couldn’t stop them completely, we certainly would make a lot of noise about it. They would certainly know they had to deal with us.”

5. The groups have in large part turned their focus to communities. Much of the work has focused on the village, urban neighborhood, and small community level, with work on the district, and national levels growing out of understandings learned within the communities.

6. Some of the groups have begun work with local politicians, members of parliament, and government administrators in the peace processes, growing out of their work within the groups. Work on the district, provincial, national, and international levels has been done by several of the groups. However, this work seems firmly rooted in the learnings, understandings, and realities of the community-based work that remains the heart of the work of these local and national peace groups.

What have been the factors that have contributed to these significant changes? Several of the people interviewed gave a number of different reasons:

1. The global changes over the last decade have had effects that are just beginning to be realized. “During the cold war, I grew up knowing that my enemies were the Russians and opponents of the Kanu government. I didn’t question that. Now those enemies are gone, and we’re all forced to look more closely at what’s really been happening.”

2. The political changes toward democratization in Kenya have opened up spaces for the development of civil society, including peace organizations. Although the democratization process in Kenya has been less than perfect, it has allowed the growth of civil society work like that of the peace groups.

3. The overt violence of the early 1990s made, we believe, a deep impression on Kenyans’ psyches, in that the long-simmering, underground conflicts could no longer be ignored. The Kenyan understanding of themselves as “a peaceful people” was shaken. This too provided space for discussion and action.
4. Several activities occurred which turned to create links between the groups. In specific, a 1995 workshop sponsored by PeaceNet and International Alert was mentioned by several people as being pivotal in the development of “the peace world.” Forty people from around Kenya who were working in some capacity in peace and conflict resolution were brought together for this workshop. More than the content itself, the development of relationships seems to have been crucial. We were surprised by the number of times during this case study when people said, “That workshop is when I met her,” or “it was during that workshop that I became aware of his work.” The relationships begun during that five-day workshop have continued until today. (Note: it was during that workshop that the two case study writers met.)

5. Funds were available during the 1990s for peace work. Regardless of the “fad” aspect of peace funding, the fact that funds have been available for the past decade has been vital. Commitment and vision require funds for implementation.

6. Each of the groups included in the case study had at least one person who received peacebuilding training, most often internationally (in Europe, the US, or South Africa). People who received the training came back energized and with new visions for the work. One person who received training at RTC talked about that “really being the turning point in my work.”

The Four Organizations

Four organizations were chosen for this case study: Amani Peoples Theatre (APT), National Council of Churches of Kenya Peace and Reconciliation Project (NCCK), Kenya Peace and Development Network (PeaceNet), and Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC). These were chosen because they represent large and small organizations, are both nationally and community based, with a variety of types of work. In addition, the case study writers were familiar with all of these groups, and had good contacts within each of them.

Because of time and logistical constraints, Dekha Ibrahim Abdi conducted the WPDC interviews, initial interviews with the other three organizations were conducted by both case study writers, and Janice Jenner followed up with more detailed interviews with those three organizations.

Kenya Peace and Development Network (PeaceNet)

The Kenya Peace and Development Network began in 1993 as an effort by local, national and international NGOs and religious organizations to coordinate the relief efforts in the aftermath of the violence and displacements in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya. It was then known as the “Ethnic Conflicts Network” (ECN) and grew quite quickly to include approximately two dozen organizations, mostly Nairobi-based. Within several months, it became clear that relief was not the major long-term concern. The discussions and focus of the organizations changed to include rehabilitation, reconciliation, and human rights issues.
The Ethnic Conflicts Network became a part of the then newly-formed NGO Council, formed following a new government registration requirements for NGOs. At that time, it was felt that the NGO Council could provide the legal cover that would allow the ECN to function, especially given the political uncertainty and stresses of that time. It was also felt that the ECN could strengthen the NGO council, which was just beginning operation.

In retrospect, with the vision of hindsight, this decision was quite problematic. Religious organizations were then engaged in a struggle with the government over whether they were exempt from registration; placing the ECN under the purview of the NGO Council made it difficult for religious organizations to fully participate. In addition, internal problems within the NGO Council held ECN/PeaceNet “hostage” at several important points and made the work difficult for several years.

Early on, ECN was a volunteer organization, with small amounts of funding for meetings and other minor expenses coming from international NGOs (chiefly Oxfam, ActionAid, and Mennonite Central Committee). A steering committee of representatives of local and international organizations was formed. General meetings were held three or four times a year. The purpose and goal of the ECN was initially to share information and coordinate services (relief and/or rehabilitation) as much as possible.

Attempts were made to make the ECN more than a “Nairobi group” and local committees were initiated in clash areas. In some areas (Bungoma, for example), ECN coordinated with local committees that were already working. In other areas, ECN attempted to set up NGO/religious committees. However, the lack of staff and funding made this problematic.

During those early years, the capacity of ECN was limited, and vision and purpose became fuzzy. Was the ECN an advocacy network, a relief network, a rehabilitation/peacebuilding organization, an information-sharing network, a conflict-prevention network? Because it was such a loose organization, and because of the fast-changing nature of events within the country, developing focus was difficult. At one point, ECN published a major report documenting the (mis)treatment of displaced people at a camp at Maela, and their unannounced removal in the middle of the night on Christmas Eve. At another time, an attempt was made to set up a rapid response component, in which people would travel to areas in which violence seemed imminent, in order to bring back accurate information about what would happen. And, as was discussed above, PeaceNet was seriously impacted by the UNDP work in 1994 and 1995.

Many mistakes were made during the early years, as individuals and organizations struggled to respond to the violence and its aftermath. However, the ECN performed a vital function of providing a space in which people working on the issues from different parts of the country, and from different bases could meet and learn from each other. ECN meetings were probably the only time in which relief, development and peace organizations, diocesan representatives from Catholic and Protestant churches, international NGOs, “Nairobi” and “upcountry” people all met in the same room to discuss what was happening in the country. As
disorganized and unfocused as the ECN was at times, providing this space and opportunity for information sharing and relationship building was extremely important and should not be underemphasized.

As was mentioned earlier, in 1995 ECN, in conjunction with International Alert, sponsored a five-day workshop on peacebuilding. In addition to the relationship building discussed in the above section, this workshop served to revitalize and refocus ECN. It was determined in the aftermath of the workshop that the Network needed funding and staffing in order to survive, and late in 1995, the first funding (US$10,000) was received from the Dutch Embassy. It was during that time that the name of the Network was changed to the “Kenyan Peace and Development Network,” commonly called PeaceNet.

However, also during this time, several key steering committee members, all representing international organizations, left the country. The personnel replacements were not smooth, creating additional organizational problems. The general dilemma about personal versus organizational commitments will be discussed below in the section on funding. The turnover of several key people within a several month period was difficult for PeaceNet. In addition, during this time, the NGO Council, under which PeaceNet operated, was having administrative and financial problems, which created further complications for PeaceNet.

Nevertheless, in early 1996, Tecla Wanjala was hired as the first PeaceNet employee, to direct the Secretariat. Ms. Wanjala had worked for several years for the Catholic Diocese of Bungoma as the director of relief and rehabilitation work, and was knowledgeable about the needs and complexities of working in the aftermath of clashes.

During 1996 and 1997, PeaceNet struggled. The Steering Committee was very strong, with serious conflicts among steering committee members. Funds were controlled by the NGO Council, creating problems for the day-to-day functioning of the Secretariat. The community structures had largely ceased to function.

In 1996, Ms. Wanjala was funded by International Alert to attend a COPA/Responding to Conflict Training in South Africa. For her, this became a major turning point. As she says, “I was able to get away, to reflect on what was happening, and to determine what needed to be done if PeaceNet were to survive, which included reorganization and limiting of the power of the steering committee, moving the organization toward independence from the NGO Council, and the development and strengthening of local community peace committees.

During this period, Alex Nyagah was hired as the Research and Information Officer. Tecla and Alex remain the program staff until now. Following Tecla’s return, the two began working on the issues mentioned above, and have accomplished many, in addition to securing funds for the support and continued work of PeaceNet.

Today, PeaceNet focuses on zonal capacity building, with local peace committees of 9-15 people each in ten areas around the county: the Coast, Western, Nyanza, Central, Nairobi, North Rift Valley, South Rift Valley, Wajir, Garissa, and the Far East (Isiolo/Marsabit/Moyale). In some cases, PeaceNet has coordinated with already operating groups, and some of the
institutional members of the Network have taken primary responsibility for certain areas. For example, Action Aid works with the Coast committee; the Ngong Diocese of the Catholic Church with Southern Rift Valley, and Oxfam (UK and Ireland) with Wajir.

PeaceNet sees its primary task as strengthening and providing resources for the local committees. They have provided training for the community peace committees, who are mostly development workers, teachers, and religious leaders. Skills development for local people continues to be a need and a top priority. At the Annual General Meeting to be held the end of April, three delegates from each of the zonal peace committees will meet together, and will receive training in Rapid Response. PeaceNet is currently seeking funds for a national workshop for women, focusing on mediation.

PeaceNet continues to experience the tension between “coordinating” and “doing.” As requests continue to come for direct PeaceNet work, it has been difficult at times to keep the focus on the empowerment of local committees. There is also an ongoing need for debriefing and “R&R” for people working in ongoing situations of conflict.

PeaceNet feels that information sharing has been one of the weaker aspects of their work. They are currently working on the first issue of a PeaceNet newsletter, one that has been delayed because of conflicts between partner members on the Steering Committee. After several unsuccessful attempts, the staff is moving ahead with this newsletter.

PeaceNet has been able to secure the funding it needs. Current funders include Bilance, Miserio, Oxfam, Action Aid, and Catholic Relief Services. Funding is stable for the next three years, allowing staff to concentrate on work rather than intense fundraising. PeaceNet staff feel they have on the whole positive relationships with their funders. Their specific comments are included in the funding section.

National Council of Churches Peace and Reconciliation Project (NCCK)

The National Council of Churches of Kenya is a national organization of main line Protestant Churches in Kenya. Founded in 1913, it is a member organization of the World Council of Churches. NCCK has been a major voice in Kenyan affairs since its inception, in particular since Kenyan independence in 1963.

The Peace and Reconciliation Project, initially called the “Land Clashes Project,” began in 1992 in response to the violent conflicts in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya. It has been located in Eldoret, about four hours northwest of Nairobi in the midst of the clash areas, since its inception. Since its inception, the NCCK project has been funded totally by Dutch government funds through Dutch Interchurch Aid (DIA). A strong partnership has been formed through the eight years of joint work, including a DIA employee seconded to the project since its beginning. Now, NCCK is in the process of diversifying its funding base, to include several other donors.
The NCCK project has gone through four distinct phases, corresponding to the perceived needs of communities during those specific times:

Phase I: January 1992-December 1993. The major activity during this period was relief, providing for the humanitarian needs of thousands of people affected by the violence. Some rehabilitation assistance was provided, as well as a very small amount of specific peace and reconciliation work.

Phase II: January 1994-August 1996. During this phase, the major activity shifted toward rehabilitation, looking at the longer-term needs of communities in the process of rebuilding. NCCK continued to provide humanitarian relief during this phase, though in smaller amounts than previously. Peace work was attempted, and some training of peace workers was done, but this was not as much or as successful as staff would have wished.

Phase III: September 1996-December 1999. During this phase, there was a major shift to peace and reconciliation issues. Although relief and rehabilitation continued in certain areas, at least 75% of efforts were concentrated on peace and reconciliation work. The staff has come to believe that unless reconciliation occurs, with the accompanying peace and stability in communities, relief and rehabilitation work will not be successful.

Phase IV: Beginning January 2000. Two tracks are being worked on in this fourth phase. Track 1 continues the local community peacebuilding and development program of Phase III. Track 2 includes the development of an advocacy process at the national level, called the “National Agenda for Peace.” Track 2 is in the initial stages of development, and is seen as important new step because of the need to address the underlying issues causing the conflicts: land, tribalism, etc. For the first year, the advocacy unit is undertaking a major national survey throughout the country, leading to profiles of districts and provinces that will identify the major problem in each area. During the second and third year of this phase, activities relating to the results of the survey will be developed and carried out.

The NCCK program is the largest and most well funded of the peace groups which have been included in this case study, with thirty staff members and a large, well-developed program of work.

The NCCK program initially started in western Kenya, beginning at Timber and extending north and west. The Catholic Church is the lead agency in the southern and eastern part of the Rift Valley, including Nakuru, Molo, Burnt Forest, etc. The division between the Catholic Church and NCCK was a joint decision made in 1992. The area covered by NCCK work has now expanded to include Transmara, Migori, Nakuru, Njoro, and Laikipia. There was an attempt to expand temporarily to Mombasa, but that was not achieved.

In the early days, 1992-1994, when displacement was highest, NCCK worked with 40,000 families (approximately 250,000 people) in 136 camps and trading centers. Between 1994-1996, work focused on communities that were ready for the healing process, and encouraged resettlement and rebuilding. Between 1996 and now, the focus has been on centers where it appeared conflicts could begin. NCCK has stayed with these areas until the present,
and is just now beginning a partial phase out of involvement in places where substantial healing has occurred. For example, in some places area peace committees may meet quarterly rather than monthly. Work with youth will continue in all areas; youth work is seen as imperative in solidifying the peace and preventing further conflict. NCCK is also exploring the possibilities introducing a peace education curriculum in primary and secondary schools, again to deal with the long-term solidification of community peace and stability.

One of the major ways in which NCCK has carried out its work is through the formation of local and area peace and development committees: currently there are 166 local committees and 24 area committees (of 22-24 people each), which are responsible for monitoring situations in the communities and working on issues as they arise. These can be very diverse, from taking notice when young men “disappear” and investigating whether they are gone for legitimate purposes or whether new fighting is being organized to dealing with pamphleting and other incitement. In addition to the monitoring functions, local peace groups have worked on projects designed to bring about rehabilitation and healing, such as reopening of markets and water points.

Throughout this period, NCCK staff has become more aware of the importance of local traditions and local wisdom. In the words of George Wachira of Nairobi Peace Initiatives/Africa, who has worked closely with NCCK since the inception of the project, “We’re no longer telling people what’s right or wrong; now we’re hearing what people are saying is right themselves.” Mr. Wachira goes on to relate his learnings about tradition, “We now recognize that cultural traditions, whether that be slaughter of bulls or reconciliation rituals, are vital and must be respected and honored.”

NCCK has recognized the political nature of the conflicts, and has held a number of workshops with local and national government officials. Since August 1996, NCCK has hosted four forums for members of parliament. The first was very difficult, with MPs so totally separated by the political divides that even getting them together was problematic. By August of 1998, when the second was held, the MPs from both KANU and opposition parties were able to come up with joint peacebuilding activities. Since then, MPs involved in this work have had the opportunity to see their crucial role in peacebuilding process, and to become strong, joint voices for clashes have occurred, or threaten to.

In addition, NCCK has done considerable work with government administration, from local chiefs and sub-chiefs, chairmen of county councils, and district officers. Because of the hierarchical nature of Kenyan government administration, it has sometimes been difficult to arrange workshops, but the NCCK staff has made it a priority to be in constant contact with district and local administration, and now has the trust and confidence of many of the government officials. Currently, Kenyans are in the process of debating a constitutional reform process. NCCK nationally has been very vocal in this debate. This has caused some problems in formal relationships with government administration, though the informal contacts remain very strong.

Has the NCCK work made a difference? As with much of peace work, it is complicated to quantify results, or to specify a cause/effect. It is possible, for instance, to say, “There had
been ongoing violence in this village, and the market had been closed. Now we have worked there and the overt violence has stopped, and the market has been opened.” However, to say that any specific work brought about this change is difficult.

However, given these limitations, NCCK staff are able to cite the following results of their work:

1. In the nine areas where NCCK has worked extensively, only one remains “hot.” Relative peace and security has returned in the other eight areas. In similar areas where NCCK has not worked, conflict and sporadic violence continues.

2. In 1991/92, much of the violence was instigated by local and national politicians. In 1997, before the elections, the same type of incitement happened in many places, but the local people chose not to respond to that incitement. Peace remained in those places. For example, in Burnt Forest and Kaptagat, among other places, leaflets were circulated in both 1992 and 1997 urging violence. In 1992, this was followed by violent clashes; in 1997, no violence happened.

3. Resettlement in many places would have taken much longer, if it had occurred at all, without NCCK intervention.

4. People now tend to view NCCK as a form of security. If attacks or rumors of impending attacks occur, community people immediately report this to the District Administration and to NCCK.

5. Because of the trust NCCK has engendered with both community people and government administration, NCCK is able to act as a linking and information-sharing entity between these groups.

6. Village and area peace committee discussions have changed in character. Originally, the problems that were discussed were political manipulation and the abuse of power. Now, peace committee discussions are changing to include longer-term issues of poverty, AIDS, development, planning for the 2002 elections.

As mentioned above, major program funding for NCCK has come from the Dutch government, through Dutch Interchurch Aid (DIA). Other funders, for emergency food and other resources, have included WCC, ICRC and Kenya Red Cross, Finnida, MSF-Spain, EU, and UNDP.

Currently, in an effort to expand their funding base, NCCK is exploring funding with a wide range of donors, including ECCO, DIA, USAID, British High Commission, Christian Aid, Danish Church Aid, Ford Foundation, the EU, and Comic Relief. Some of these organizations have already pledged funds; with others, the discussions are continuing.

NCCK thoughts and concerns about funding and funding relationships are included in that section, following.
Amani Peoples Theatre

Amani (Kiswahili for “peace”) Peoples Theatre (APT) is a group of young Kenyan artistes using drama as a vehicle for conflict transformation and peace education. In contrast to the other groups in this case study, which tend to use a variety of techniques to impact specific conflict and/or areas, APT has chosen to develop one conflict transformation method for use in a wide variety of conflicts.

APT began in 1994, as a part of People for Peace in Africa, a Catholic peace organization. A group of social activist artistes began experimenting with what they called the “theatre for peace awareness programme.” Sometimes this included the use of scripted plays to provoke discussion among audiences. Increasingly, the drama took on an interactive dimension, which drew audience members into the dramatic production, providing alternative endings, taking over parts from the original actors, or acting out actual conflicts that were taking place in that context.

APT became independent from People for Peace in 1997, and since then has been continuing to work on the development of theatre for peace in communities around Kenya. APT has one full-time and two part-time staff members; as well as a large number of volunteer facilitators (18 fully trained facilitators and a number more in training). APT defines the goals and purposes of their group as:

1. Providing a space to reflect on various conflicts so that participants can begin to ask themselves how to address these conflicts.
2. Nurturing critical thinking in the participants, drawing on their cultural knowledge and traditions.
3. Focus on nonviolence and its place in Kenyan tradition and society.
4. Assisting people in looking at locally available resources; the links between peace and development.

APT gets requests from a variety of groups for drama workshops – schools, community groups, local churches and dioceses. It continues its close connection with the Catholic Church. Sometimes the request comes because of a specific conflict. For example, a secondary school experiencing problems between students and administration may call in APT to work with the students and staff to resolve this specific issue. In other cases, APT works with communities to deal with wider issues – the place of tradition in Kenya today, democratization, leadership and governance, etc.

Because APT’s capacity is limited, the members have chosen to focus their efforts in four areas of Kenya: Nyanza, Ukambani (Machakos/Kitui), Wajir, and Nairobi. For the past two years, APT has conducted basic training programs in each of these areas for community leaders interested in APT work. These workshops include training in theatre, conflict transformation, alternative leadership styles, and spirituality/sustenance. The training has been targeted at key people in communities who command wide respect within the community; often this includes teachers, social workers, women and youth, church leaders, chiefs, etc.
Recently, APT has begun an intermediate training program, for people who have completed the basic training. This training includes social theories and interactive theories of theatre and conflict transformation. This intermediate training is not regionally based, and has the added benefit of linking people from various parts of the country, increasing the web of relationships.

APT is aware of the importance of follow-up, and not stranding people. It’s not enough to provide one training and then to leave. To deal with this, APT has links to a large number of local peace organizations as well as publishing several newsletter and information sheets for their contacts and trainees. Some of the major local partners of APT include the Education Office of the Nairobi Catholic Diocese, the Catholic Diocese of Kisumu, Hekima Peace Forum, Chemchemi ya Ukweli, Mombasa Diocese of the Anglican Church of Kenya, PeaceNet, Wajir Peace and Development Committee, Amani ya Mungu, Nyanza/Western Linking Network of 100 CBOs.

International partners/donors for APT have included: DKA (Austrian Catholic Youth Organization), Christian Aid, Comic Relief (via Christian Aid), and CAFOD. Once again, the discussion of funding relationships is included below.

**Wajir Peace and Development Network**

The Wajir Peace and Development Committee was formed in 1995 as a coordinating committee that brought together various local peace groups that began to work separately in 1993 (Wajir Women for Peace, Youth for Peace, Elders for Peace, business people, religious leaders, and government officials). Unlike the other groups discussed in this report, the WPDC is an organization formed by local citizens directly impacted by violent conflict. It was not formed by NGOs or other “professionals” but is instead a result of members of civil society rejecting continuing violence that was destabilizing their communities and destroying their lives.

The WPDC is officially a subcommittee of the District Development Committee, a government-mandated committee composed of district administration, NGO’s and civil society representative. This gives WPDC official legitimacy, and allows for continued interaction and joint work involving civil society, NGOs, religious leaders, and government.

WPDC has developed the following mission statement to guide their work: “Wajir Peace and Development Committee strives to achieve peace where conflicts are resolved peacefully, by use of traditional and modern means, which would improve education, health, and income, leading to improved quality of life.”

Terms of Reference have also been developed:

1. To study objectively why peace is elusive by looking at historical and cultural perspectives and finding out the factors that contribute to perpetual insecurity.
2. To put local and social policy in place that will redress the insecurity.
3. To involve the community in participating in initiatives that will enhance peace.
4. To involve the community in raising funds for peace. These funds will act as a reserve to supplement and boost the resources that will enable those concerned with security to respond to duty quickly and effectively.
5. To undertake community education through: creation of dialogue, public mobilization, information gathering and dissemination, reconciliation workshops, formal education, creating positive public image of the District through media and exchange visits, organizing of annual peace festivals, networking with neighboring districts and the nation/state.
7. Creation of employment and assessment of opportunities.
8. Soliciting for resources from outside Wajir community that will enhance peace and development.
9. Rational management of the available resources.

The Wajir Peace and Development Committee has undertaken a number of activities to bring about peace and security. These include:

1. Rapid Response Team, comprised of elders, religious leaders, women, and security officers, moves into any part of the district to diffuse tension and mediate in case of any conflict or violence reported.
2. Community education, including local workshops for religious leaders, government officials, NGO workers, and community members; community peace days; sending peace workers to national, regional, and international peace courses; and peace education in primary schools.
3. Strengthening of peace structures by coordinating the following groups, all of which are part of WPDC and represented on the coordinating committee: Council of Elders, Youth for Peace, Women for Peace, Religious leaders for Peace, six village peace committees, thirteen divisional peace committees, regional peace committees. These provide direct links with five regions and networking within Kenya and neighboring countries.
4. Sustaining peace by raising money locally for the peace process and ensuring continuity of the work. Also included in this work is informing and involving new people in the peace process.
5. Economic development aimed at the youth, who are the worst affected by the conflict. They are the most active in the society, but are unemployed, and easily lured into participating in the conflict. The activities have included: the revival of the youth polytechnics for skill development for the young people, income generation activities for the ex-combatants, and the improvement of formal education in schools.
6. National and regional linkages to link the peace process in Wajir to other parts of the country and neighboring countries. This has included input into the peace initiatives in a neighboring district, and a memorandum of understanding with elders of south Somalia.
7. Documentation. As a way of recording history and the peace process, and to allow continuity and learning from it, the WPDC has documented the process in video and in print.

Some of these activities, especially the economic developments and workshops are not currently happening due to the lack of funding.
All the activities are interrelated and have come out of need and the realization of what needs to be done. For example, WPDC began with the Rapid Response Team, which was direct intervention. That was not sustainable on its own, so WPDC undertook the community education and strengthening of peace structures. Also while the main focus has been in Wajir, WPDC has realized the need to work at other levels and groups in neighboring regions and countries as the Wajir people are part and parcel of the wider Kenyan society and regional communities.

In the beginning, the funding of the peace work in Wajir was ad hoc, spontaneous, and very small, with an emphasis on local funding. The local community raised over 200,000 Kenya shillings (US$5000). There was no long-term funding. All the funding was short-term, activity-oriented. The funding has come from three sources: local community, government, and international organizations. Each made complementary contributions.

WPDC has had cordial relationships with funders and partners. The types of funding received so far have included small annual grants and short-term activity based grants. Organizations that have funded the work in Wajir so far are Mennonite Central Committee, Oxfam, Quaker Peace and Service, Greenville Foundation, Kenyan government, and the community. Specific comments about the funding relationships are included in that section, following.

The WPDC has articulated some of the lessons they have learned in the past seven years, along with some of their mistakes. The first lesson is that the government must be involved in the peace work from the beginning, along with civic society. The community realized that the elders could mediate but could not act as police or a judicial system. Hence, it was necessary to bring in the government as a peacebuilding partner.

For the first five years, from 1993 to 1998, WPDC looked inward and worked mainly within the Wajir context. Members began to realize that the issues in neighboring districts and countries affect the peace situation within Wajir District. WPDC has begun to work outside the district, helping others to find their own process and learn from the experience of WPDC. This has led to five neighboring districts forming their own peace committees and starting to do something about their own context.

In the beginning, some important leaders were labeled as “bad.” This made work difficult. WPDC found that engaging these people and bringing them into the process made drastic and positive changes in the peacebuilding work.

While it is difficult to measure success in this field; some key points listed by WPDC members are:

1. Before 1993, the community waited for the government to resolve the conflict in the community; today the community takes the initiative to solve it.
2. Before 1993, the government used violence and military might to resolve any conflict and it involved the community passively. Now the government involves the community actively and uses non-violent means to solve any problems.
3. The presence of inclusive peace structures that plan and implement peace is a measure of peace.
4. Low level or reduced incidences of violence in the district.
5. Acceptance by the government of peace education being taught in schools.
6. Increased number of people and organizations involved in the peace process.
7. Community raising funds for peace rather than war.
8. WPDC is an inter-communal nonsectarian organization.
9. Acceptance of nonviolence (mediation) as ways of resolving conflict.
10. Involvement of women and youth in the peace process.
11. Individual rejection of violence or incitement to violence.

Relationships with Funders

The four groups and others interviewed for this case study raised a number of issues and dilemmas in relationship to funding. Listed below are some of these:

Issues Relating Primarily to Local/National Peacebuilding Organizations

1. “A genuinely good program will always get funding from genuinely interested donors.” “Waves will come and go, but a good boat will always stay afloat.” Local peace groups need first to concentrate on developing legitimate, worthwhile programs.

2. Local and national peace groups need to be clear about their aims and work and not be swayed by fads in funding – “we need to keep working on peace and not be swayed by civic education, democratization, etc. funding.” There is continual pressure and temptation to conform to the donor’s agenda. This needs to be resisted, even if it means losing a lot of money by doing so.

3. We local organizations need to be very clear about our capacity, our goals and agenda, and our accountability – both to donors and to communities

4. We need to be self-confident about our abilities and dreams, and need to learn to articulate these dreams and abilities to donors in a way that makes sense, and excites them.

5. Community peace work needs to build on local resources and systems, existing peace structures and activities. Local groups as well as international organizations/donors need to carefully acknowledge and work with these local capacities, rather than setting up new systems that duplicate or discredit what already exists. Local peace groups need to take the lead to make sure that local realities are honored and trusted.

6. Local and national groups need to set the agenda for peace work. Donors and international groups can assist and support, but should not take over or derail local
processes. The development of strong local groups can reduce the chances of the process being overtaken from outside. “Another UNDP couldn’t happen now.” “Our task is to lead this journey, not let the donors do it.”

7. There are many opportunist organizations and individuals parading as peace organizations. The “indicators” are an attempt by donors to separate the genuine organizations from the false ones. Genuine organizations need to be self-critical and to work together with the donors to come up with methods of accountability that will separate the genuine organizations from the opportunist ones.
   A. BINGO – Briefcase NGO (Nothing but a briefcase to carry the money in)
   B. MANGO – Mafia NGO (criminal organization masquerading as an NGO)
   C. GINGO – Government NGO (government masquerading as NGO)
   D. NGI – Non-governmental Individual

8. Peace groups need to educate donors about the nature of the work, particularly the differences between development work and peace work. Some of the issues that peace groups need to clearly articulate to donors include:
   A. Peacebuilding involves attitude and behavioral change, which takes time. People and communities who have a history of distrust, stereotyping, and violence will not come to a position of trust and stability through short-term workshops or other work.
   B. Most of peacebuilding is simply talking – talking with one group and then another. It is not easy to put a lot of this into the type of reports that donors want.
   C. Likewise, peacebuilding reporting is often storytelling. It is difficult to fit the stories into the kind of reporting that is required. For example, in one village in northern Kenya, one indicator of returning peace and stability is the fact that the bars are full and people are mingling, drinking and laughing together, rather than gathering in corners and talking in low tones.
   D. It is hard to quantify much of peacebuilding work and/or to link specific results to specific activities. “I did this, I saw this happen, but I can’t prove I caused it.”
   E. In peace work there is a need to be confidential in some aspects. Some activities are done under cover. The people involved cannot be mentioned explicitly, and sometimes you fear to inform your donors because they may not approve. The confidentiality is important as the peacebuilding is dangerous work and the lack of confidentiality can mean risking the entire process and can endanger the peace worker. There is need for understanding, trust, and the readiness to take risk.
   F. Time is crucial. It can be either a friend or foe. Sometimes delay means disaster. Some donors delay a lot in making decisions. This has had a negative impact on the work as the situation is dynamic, and changes happen rapidly. Any delay for more than three months will mean changes of activities, thinking, and strategies. This requires understanding on the side of the donors.

9. Peace organizations need to understand the demands on donors. Their money is coming from somewhere; they do not pull it out of the air. They are accountable to either taxpayers of the country, or church members, or others who are the ultimate source of the
money. We need to give them a way of reporting on our work in a way that makes sense to their funders.

10. Peace organizations also need to understand the demands on individual donor representatives. Even if the representative understands the peace work and situation well, somewhere behind them in the bureaucracy is a technician who needs to fit everything onto the “prescribed reporting form.” Again, peacebuilding organizations and donors need to work together to find mutually acceptable ways of reporting that will fit the needs of all groups. How do you relate “peacebuilding stories” in a way that fits into the forms that bureaucracies require?

Issues Relating Primarily to Donors

1. Funders can be fickle. They often seem to want fast results without understanding the long-term nature of peacebuilding, especially in the aftermath of violence or long-term structural injustice.

2. Funders are good at emergencies; there seems to be little problem with getting money for relief or emergency work. Relief can leave a bad syndrome, where local people keep asking, “where is our food.” After the initial emergency is the time to develop the capacities of the people to solve their own problems. Securing on-going funding for this is problematic

3. Funders often do not stick around long enough to secure the peace, which can lead right back into another emergency situation. They do not want to accompany you in cementing the peace. We need donors who have a long-term commitment to our work, not someone who will be out the door and onto the next fad next year.

4. Funders are often more interested in funding specific projects rather than long-term core funding for staffing and capacity building. You cannot run projects without core support. The donors are interested in short-term, activity-based grants. It has been difficult to get longer-term core funding with flexibility. Donors want activities that will be undertaken and to know the expected output for peacebuilding. It is easy to get a general framework of what needs to be done but the situation dictates what needs to be done, so you sometimes cannot determine specifics in advance. This requires understanding by the donor who has a development project mentality and would like things to be explicit.

5. Some donor agencies still have the “borehole” mentality of development work – “how many products will you deliver in what time with what resources?

6. Often a little money that is incremental and promises a long-term commitment to the process is more helpful than lots of money too fast and with little planning. It would be very helpful if a donor would make even a very small commitment over a long time, especially five years of core funding, with specific funding for events or initiatives that are located within the overall process.
7. “Indicators” can be a “new brand of opium” for donors. There seems to be an unnecessary rush to develop indicators to fit development language. This can bring about extra pressure and stress to “deliver a product” rather than to “work on a process.”

Issues Relating Primarily to the Peace Group/Donor Relationship

1. The funding relationship is inherently tricky. As long as you are dependent on outside funding, the bottom line is that you are in a vulnerable position – whether as an individual, an organization, or a country. “There’s no free lunch.” It is a question of independence versus vulnerability.

2. Developing relationships with donors is very important. Because of the nature of peace work, there needs to be a spirit of mutual trust and accountability. Donors need to understand the fluid nature of peace work, and the relationship must be one in which peace groups can call and discuss funding changes at short notice. “The workshop that we planned with Village X needs to be called off because of the situation there now, and we need to use the money for a rapid response to the emerging crisis in District Z.” The relationship needs to be based on such things as:
   A. Mutual trust and accountability – I need to know the donor trusts me, and they need to know that I am accountable to the communities as well as to them.
   B. We want the donors to understand the situations, to visit and see what is happening. We do not want just a paper reporting relationship.
   C. We need donors to be interested in what we are doing, so that we know that it is a real partnership.
   D. We need the type of relationship that allows failure. Lots of our work is unpredictable, and we need to have the courage and freedom to admit what does not work. This is where trust comes in – the donor has to trust that we are doing well in spite of failures, and we need to trust the donor that reporting failures honestly will not jeopardize future funding.

3. Because of the above need, relationships need to be personal as well as organizational. The best donor/implementing agency relationships are one based on mutual trust and understanding on a personal level. However, this creates a dilemma also because when individuals change (in either the donor or local organization), the relationship has to begin from the beginning again. The ideal is a balance between personal and organizational relationships. This is a difficult balance to maintain.

4. For many donors, and for some peacebuilding staff, the work is a job. For many others working in or with peacebuilding organizations, “this is our life.” There needs to be recognition of the high personal price that many peacebuilders pay for their work. Space (and funding) for individual support, encouragement, and “time out” needs to be created.

5. There also needs to be recognition (by both local and international groups) of the high personal stakes for community people involved in peacemaking. If accountability is lacking, or funds are misused, personal and family reputations are at stake.
6. There also needs to be recognition (formal, if possible) of the contributions of local people. For example, the value of countless volunteer hours by many people in a peace process is often not included in the tabulations of “local contributions” when a grant is evaluated.

7. Donors and local/national groups need to work together to come up with ways of evaluating work that takes into account the complexities and uncertainties of peacebuilding and conflict transformation work, and yet is able to separate carefully done, valid, effective peace work from work that does not meet acceptable standards.

Challenges and Dilemmas

In addition to the funding dilemmas, peace workers spoke of a number of other challenges that face the “Kenyan peace world.” Some of these are:

1. Peacebuilding itself is a challenging, complex, dynamic process that calls for patience, tolerance, and the ability to deal with a variety of long- and short-term demands. Peacebuilders often pay a great personal price, whether in lost salaries, personal relationships, or even personal safety. For example, in the last year, three Kenyan peacebuilders have died in the course of their work (one in a direct attack during peacebuilding work, one caught in a perhaps unrelated shooting, one in a road accident during the course of her work).

2. The fragility of the nation-state, global and regional issues, and the changing nature of leadership and governance will lead to challenges and dilemmas for peacebuilders over the next period of time. This is especially true in Africa, where many forms of governance and societal relationships are being challenged.

3. The interaction of global with regional and local issues is an important phenomenon that is often not well understood. Even if it is understood, it is often hard for local organizations to respond to these global forces.

4. One challenge is making peace work sustainable so that people own their own peace process. Peacebuilding is about helping people change, and that is inherently challenging. Peacebuilders need to hold fast to the belief that people have the capacity to change and to create their own structures and processes.

5. In Kenya, there is the dilemma and challenge of working with both the traditional cultures and the “modern” realities. How can we honor, respect, and use the traditions while at the same time taking into account the realities of the modern world? How can we work with traditional conflict resolution systems for dealing with, for example, cattle theft, when now the weapon of choice is an automatic rifle rather than a spear?

6. In Kenya, it would be helpful to have more coordination and information sharing among the various groups. Now there is still some competition and suspicion between us. There is a
need to create harmony among peace organizations themselves, as well as between peacebuilding organizations and government.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1991</td>
<td>Kenya President legalizes opposition politics</td>
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<td>Dec. 1991</td>
<td>Ethnic fighting begins in Western Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992-1994</td>
<td>Ethnic fighting spreads through large parts of Western, Rift Valley,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Northeastern, and Coast Provinces of Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 1992</td>
<td>Phase 1 of NCCK Peace and Rehabilitation Programme begins in Eldoret</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 1992</td>
<td>First multi-party presidential election held</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid 1993</td>
<td>Ethnic Conflict Network (to become Peace and Development Network of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya) is organized</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid 1993</td>
<td>Wajir Women for Peace is organized</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late 1993-1994</td>
<td>Other Wajir groups organized: Elders for Peace, Youth for Peace,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>business people, religious leaders, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 1994</td>
<td>Phase 2 of NCCK Peace and Rehabilitation Programme begins</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>A group of young social activists begin a “theatre for peace</td>
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<td></td>
<td>awareness programme,” later to become Amani Peoples Theatre,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>under the auspices of People for Peace in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>UNDP Resettlement work in Rift Valley</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid 1995</td>
<td>ECN/PeaceNet holds Limuru workshop for peaceworkers throughout</td>
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<td></td>
<td>the country</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid 1995</td>
<td>Wajir Peace and Development Committee, a coalition of the various</td>
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<td></td>
<td>peace groups in Wajir, forms and becomes part of the Wajir District</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Development Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late 1995</td>
<td>Ethnic Conflict Network changes name to Kenya Peace and Development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>Early 1996</td>
<td>PeaceNet hires first staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept. 1996</td>
<td>Phase 3 of NCCK Peace and Rehabilitation Programme begins</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Amani Peoples Theatre becomes independent from People for Peace in</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 1997</td>
<td>Second multi-party presidential election held</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 2000</td>
<td>Phase 4 of NCCK Peace and Rehabilitation Programme begins</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Organizational Structure

Kenya Peace and Development Network (PeaceNet)

Member Organizations (@24)

Steering Committee

Secretariat (2 professional staff)

9 local peace committees

National Council of Churches of Kenya Peace and Rehabilitation Programme

Member Churches (Mainline Protestant)

National Council of Churches of Kenya Staff (>300)

Development Department (one of six major departments)

Peace and Rehabilitation Programme (one of several programmes of Dev. Dept.)

14 professional staff

24 area peace committees; 166 local peace committees
Amani Peoples Theatre

Governing Board

Secretariat
(1 full-time; 2 part-time professional staff)

18 volunteer trainers; more receiving training

Wajir Peace and Development Committee

Wajir District Administration       Non-Governmental Organizations
                                      
                                      District Development Committee
                                      
                                      WPDC (one of several subcommittees of DDC)
                                      
                                      Women for Peace, Elders for Peace, Youth for Peace, business people, religious leaders, others
People Interviewed

Fatuma Sheikh Abduldakir, Arid Lands Programme
Nuria Abdullahi Abdi, Secretary, WPDC
Babu Ayindo, Amani Peoples Theatre
Abdi Billow, Wajir Youth for Peace
Peter Gatheru, Director, NCCK Peace and Reconciliation Programme
Abdisalan Gure, Wajir Youth for Peace
Abdi karim Ibrahim, WPDC
Ephraim Kiragu, NCCK, Director of Development Office
Paul Hessloat, Technical Advisor, NCCK Peace and Reconciliation Programme
Sabina Gottschalk, Amani Peoples Theatre intern
CM Kingori, Accountant, NCCK Peace and Reconciliation Programme
Harold Miller, Mennonite Central Committee
Immanual Mumba, Hekima Peace Forum
Bernard Mumba, Hekima Peace Forum
Mohamed Hassan Mumin Council of Elders
Joseph Ngala, People for Peace in Africa
Alex Nyaga, PeaceNet
Rosemary Okoth, Amani Peoples Theatre
Elias Omondi, Hekima Peace Forum
Otieno Ombok, Chemchemi ya Ukweli
Michael Owiso, Amani Peoples Theatre
Halima Ao Shurie Regional coordinator, WPDC
Jebiwot Sumbeiyo, Program Officer, NCCK Peace and Reconciliation Programme
George Wachira, Nairobi Peace Initiatives/Africa
Tecla Wanjala, PeaceNet